The Contribution of Organizational Justice in Budget Decision-Making to Federal Managers' Organizational Commitment
Staley, Andrew Blair, Dastoor, Barbara, Magner, Nace R., Stolp, Chandler, Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management
ABSTRACT. This study examines the contribution of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice in Federal budget decision-making to Federal managers' commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization. A total of 1,358 useable surveys were received from a sample of 9,643 managers. Reliability coefficients were acceptable (> .70), and intercorrelations consistent with previous studies. Hierarchical regression analysis supported only main-effect relationships between procedural justice and interactional justice and managers' organizational commitment. No support was found for a main effect relationship between distributive justice and organizational commitment - or for any interactive effects. Contrary to models of bureaucratic behavior based on economic theory, these findings may suggest that Federal managers may be motivated primarily by psychological outcomes of budget decisions.
Scholars broadly define organizational justice as fairness in the allocation of organizational resources (Homans, 1982). This study empirically examines the effect of organizational justice in Federal budget decision-making on Federal managers' commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization. This study seeks to add to scholarly understanding of behavioral aspects of budgeting and organizational justice, contribute to professional understanding of budget formulation policies and procedures that lead to increased organizational commitment and suggest areas for future research.
This study presents an overview of organizational justice, including a review of organizational justice literature and development of hypotheses. It then details the methodology used - the model, the subjects, the measurement of variables, and data collection. Next, it presents the results of a hierarchical regression analysis test of the hypotheses. The study concludes with a discussion of the results, including the aforementioned implications for scholarly understanding, professional management and future research.
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW
Academics and policy makers have long been interested in the effects of budget decision-making on organizational behavior. Niskanen's (1971) model in which budgets are maximized to increase salary and prestige is perhaps the most famous model of how employees and organizations react to governmental budget decision-making (see Friedman, 1984, for an excellent discussion of this model).
Beyond Niskanen, traditional accounting-based research on budget decision-making and organizational behavior has focused on the relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance (Hopwood, 1974). Most of these studies find a positive relationship between participation in the budgetary process and managerial performance (Brownell & McInnes, 1986; Merchant, 1981; see also Hopwood, 1974), although, due to such factors as corporate culture (Brownell, 1982), the size the budget (Aranya, 1990), and performance standards (Dunk, 1989, 1990), this finding is not universal (Brownell, 1981, 1983; Milani, 1975).
Separately, academics and policy makers have long been interested in the effect of resource allocation in general on organizational behavior, namely, in the effect of organizational justice - distributive justice, procedural justice, and interpersonal justice-on organizational behavior. Homans (1961, p. 74) defines distributive justice as "justice in the distribution of rewards and costs between persons." Homans (1961) theorizes that an individual's reaction to an organization is dependent on the expected relationship (based on personal or reference group experience) between the individual's contributions to the organization and the resources allocated by the organization to the individual. Adams (1965) extends and expands the concept of distributive justice, labeling it equity theory and applying it to organizational behavior. Adams (1965, pp. 276-277) focuses on the consequences (such as quit rates) of employees' comparison of inputs ("education, intelligence, experience, training, ... ") to outputs (such as pay).
In contrast, procedural justice is justice in the procedures used to determine the allocation of organizational resources, not the amount of the resource itself (Allen, 1982). Thibaut and Walker (1975) define the self-interest theory of procedural justice - that an individual's reaction to an organization depends on the adequacy of the procedures used to allocate the organization's resources because of the belief that certain procedures, such as those that give individuals more control over the decision process, will ultimately produce more favorable outcomes. Lind and Tyler (1988) define an alternative model of procedural justice, the group value model, and suggest that an individual's reaction to an organization depends on the adequacy of the procedures because the presence and use of certain procedures, such as those that allow for participation in decisions, immediately leads to feelings of self-esteem (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Bies and Moag (1986) define interactional justice as the "quality of interpersonal treatment ... [persons] receive during the enactment of organizational procedures" (p. 44). Interactional justice theory holds that an individual's reaction to an organization is dependent on the individual's interpersonal treatment during the allocative decision process and the organizational justice literature has evolved to define interactional justice as decision makers' provision of adequate explanations for the decision, and treating employees with respect when implementing the decision (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Moorman, 1991; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).1
Subsequent to the development of the main dimensions of organizational justice, Folger and his colleagues (Folger, 1986; Skarlicki & Folger; 1997; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999) discuss interactions between distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice. First, Folger (1986) labels the interaction of distributive justice theory and procedural justice as referent cognitions theory, and holds that an individual's "negative reactions to a resource allocation decision occur when two conditions are met: (a) the outcomes associated with the decision are considerably lower than easily imagined alternative outcomes and (b) the procedures that give rise to outcomes are unfair, thereby rendering the outcomes unjustified" (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996, p. 193). More recently, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) and Skarlicki, Folger and Tesluk (1999) discuss a three-way interaction between distributive justice, procedural justice and interactional justice, postulating that either procedural justice or interactional justice may be substituted to ameliorate negative reactions resulting from distributive injustice.
As a theory of organizational behavior, organizational justice is clearly applicable to governmental budget decision-making. After all, budget decision-making fundamentally concerns the distribution of organizational resources, and the basic question in budgeting is: "On what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B" (Key, 1940/1992, p. 110). While Lewis (1952/1992) theorizes that budget allocation decisions should be made based on the marginal benefit of the next dollar added in apportioning dollars to one activity versus another, Wildavsky (1975) suggests that budget decisions are made in practice on the principles of proportional balance, arbitration (that is, following procedures), and interpersonal trust (see also Jones & McCaffery, 1994; Schick, 1994; White, 1994).
In regard to organizational justice, proportional balance is clearly analogous to distributive justice, as both concepts are concerned with the actual distribution of resources to the distributee in relation to distributions to referent groups. Arbitration is clearly analogous to procedural justice in that both concepts focus on procedures and not on actual results. Interpersonal trust is clearly analogous to interactional justice as both concepts focus on the interpersonal behavior between the budget requester and budget decision maker. Thus, organizational justice provides a framework for evaluating the effect of the approaches to budget decision-making on organizational behavior.
Kim and Mauborgne (1993), Lindquist (1995), Libby (1999), and Welker and Magner and their colleagues (Ehlen, Magner, & Welker, 1999; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Magner, Welker, & Campbell, 1995; Welker & Magner, 1994) are some of the researchers who have used organizational justice to evaluate the impact of budget decision-making and related processes on organizations. In general, these studies find that procedural justice in budgeting is related to positive organizational outcomes and affects (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Welker & Magner, 1994). And, in general, these studies find that procedural justice ameliorates the effect of distributive injustice on organizational outcomes and affects (Lindquist, 1995; Libby, 1999; Ehlen et al., 1999; Magner et al., 1995), although the findings are not uniform on which model of procedural justice has the ameliorating effect, and the ameliorating effect does not apply uniformly to all organizational outcomes and affects tested.
Organizational justice also provides a framework for evaluating the effect of resource allocation other than budget decision-making (e.g., pay decisions) on organizational behavior. Early field studies of organizational justice find main effect relationships between the various dimensions of organizational justice and organizational outcomes, with procedural justice and interactional justice having stronger effects than distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990). Later studies find an interactive effect between distributive justice and procedural justice, or between distributive justice and interactional justice and find that either procedural justice or interactional justice ameliorates the negative effect of distributive injustice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). More recently, Folger and Skarlicki and their colleagues (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Skarlicki et al., 1999) examine the three-way interaction between distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on organizational behavior, and find that either high levels of procedural justice or high levels of interactional justice may interact with distributive justice to ameliorate low levels of distributive justice with respect to organizational retaliation behavior.
In sum, organizational justice postulates that an individual's reaction to organizational resource allocation is dependent on distributive justice (Adams; 1965; Homans, 1961), procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and interactional justice (Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Governmental budget theory (Wildavsky, 1975) holds that decisions allocating the government's budget are made on bases that may be analogous to distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Previous research finds main effect relationships between the organizational justice and organizational outcomes and affects in resource allocation and in budget decision-making (Brownell & McInnes, 1986; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Merchant, 1981; see also Greenberg, 1990). Thus, hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c are offered:
Hypothesis 1a: Controlling for procedural justice and interactional justice, Federal managers who receive a budget that is fair given their unit's inputs and level of efforts (distributive justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization.
Hypothesis 1b. Controlling for distributive justice and interactional justice, Federal managers who receive a budget that was developed with fair formal procedures (procedural justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization.
Hypothesis 1c. Controlling for distributive justice and procedural justice, Federal managers who receive a budget that was developed with fair interpersonal conduct by budget decision makers (interactional justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization.
Referent cognitions theory (Folger, 1986; see also Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) holds that procedural justice or interactional justice interacts with distributive justice to ameliorate the effect of distributive injustice with respect to organizational outcomes. Previous research finds referent cognitions effects in budget decision-making (Lindquist, 1995; Libby, 1999; Magner et al., 1995). Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are offered:
Hypothesis 2a. Federal managers who receive a budget that is fair given their unit's inputs and level of efforts (distributive justice) or was developed with fair formal procedures (procedural justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization.
Hypothesis 2b. Federal managers who receive a budget that is fair given their unit's inputs and level of efforts (distributive justice) or was developed with fair interpersonal conduct by budget decision makers (interactional justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization.
Folger and Skarlicki and their colleagues (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Skarlicki et al., 1999) find that either procedural justice or interactional justice may interact with distributive justice to ameliorate distributive injustice. Thus, hypothesis 3 is offered.
Hypotheses 3. Federal managers who did not receive a fair budget in relation to their unit's inputs and level of efforts (distributive injustice) but who received a budget that was developed either with fair formal procedures (procedural justice) or with fair interpersonal conduct by budget decision makers (interactional justice) will have higher levels of commitment to the Federal government as an employer.
This cross-sectional study empirically examines the relationship between the Federal government's allocative decision on an individual's budget and the bureaucrat's behavior - that is, bureaucrats' reaction to the decision on their budgets. Following Skarlicki and Folger (1997) and Skarlicki et al. (1999) this study conducts a three-step hierarchical regression analysis. This study uses organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1979, 1982) as the dependent variable, and distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice as the independent variables. This study entered distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice in block one (main effect); distributive justice ? procedural justice, distributive justice ? interactional justice, and procedural justice ? interactional justice in block two (two-way interactions); and distributive justice ? procedural justice ? interactional justice in block three (three-way interaction). Significance was evaluated using the change in F.
Subjects of Analysis
This study uses as subjects Federal executives (managers) who both supervise Federal personnel and have a budget. These subjects represent the job category that has budget responsibilities in the Federal government and for whom organizational commitment is paramount; commitment to the organization from these managers is necessary to accomplish organizational missions (Dressier, 1999; Mowday et al., 1979; Nyhan, 1999). Respondents self-reported their status as Federal manager, the type of budget received, and the date of their budget.
Measurement of Dependent Variable
This study uses organizational commitment as the measure of organizational outcomes. Organizational behavior theory and research suggest that furthering organizational commitment is key to successful management (i.e., is linked to performance). For example, Mowday et al. (1982) find that organizational commitment reduces absenteeism and turnover and increases organizational effectiveness. And, Dressier (1999) suggests that organizational commitment is necessary for employees' self-management and that organizational commitment is also positively associated with employees' organizational citizenship behavior and level of efforts. Also, organizational commitment has been used in organizational justice research (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Magner & Johnson, 1995; Magner et al., 1995; see also Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996, for a summary), and it has been linked to a reduced propensity to create budgetary slack (Nouri, 1994).
Following Kim and Mauborgne (1993), Folger and Konovsky (1989), Magner and Johnson (1995), and Magner, Welker, and Campbell (1995), organizational commitment was measured using the short-form of Mowday, Steers, and Porter's (1979) questionnaire. This questionnaire contained nine items. The questions were in a Likert-type format, ranging from disagree (1) to agree (7). A typical statement in this index is "I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help the Federal government be successful."
Measurement of Independent Variables
Following Moorman (1991) and McFarlin and Sweeney (1992), distributive justice is measured using an index adapted from Price and Mueller (1986). Although originally formulated as a five-point Likerttype format, a seven-point index ranging from disagree (1) to agree (7) is used for consistency. A typical statement in this index is "My unit received a fair budget considering the amount of effort my unit puts forth." Procedural justice is measured using an index adapted from Moorman's (1991). Moorman's index was itself adapted from Greenberg (1986) and is consistent with Orphen (1994). Moorman's index contained seven items, and uses a seven-point Likert-type index ranging from disagree (1) to agree (7). A typical statement in this index is "Budget decision makers used formal procedures designed to ensure that decisions on my budget could be made with consistency." Consistent with Moorman (1991) and Gavin, Green, and Fairhurst (1995), interactional justice is measured using five of six items from Moorman's index. This index also uses a seven-point Likert-type index ranging from disagree (1) to agree (7), and a typical statement in this index is "Budget decision makers treated me with kindness and consideration."
This study collected data with a five-page self-administered questionnaire sent to the 9,643 "Executive Command" mailing list of Federal executives maintained by Government Executive Magazine. Eliminating respondents who identified themselves as not being Federal managers as well as those with missing data in the dependent or independent variable data resulted in 1,358 usable surveys, a response rate of 14%. Eighty percent (1,086) of the respondents are male; there are 154 (11.3%) females, with 118 (8.7%) no responses to the demographic question on gender. The mean age of the respondents is 49.94 years, with a standard deviation of 6.56 years, a minimum age of 27, and a maximum age of 80. A majority (931 or 68.6%) is in a civilian job series, including 125 (9.2%) in the Senior Executive Service. Some 188 (13.8%) are part of a military job series, and there are 239 (17.6%) no responses to the question on job series.
Career GS-ISs are the superior of a plurality of the respondents -407 or 30%. Career Senior Executive Service members are the superior of 267 (19.7%) respondents, with political appointees the superior of 207 (15.2%) of the respondents, other career incumbents the superiors for 362 (26.6%) of the respondents, and 115 (8.5%) no responses to the demographic question on superior.
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliabilities
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities for the variables. The intercorrelations for the organizational justice variables are consistent with Skarlicki and Folger (1997). The alpha reliability coefficients are all acceptable, exceeding the common threshold of .70 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). A rotated factor matrix (not shown) loaded distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on three separate factors (all loadings above .5; most loadings above .8).
Table 2 summarizes the hierarchical regression analysis for procedural justice, distributive justice, and interactional justice in budget decision-making on Federal managers' organizational commitment. (A four-step hierarchical regression, not shown, was also conducted, with gender, age, and tenure entered at step one. The control variables are not significant and did not change the results of the three-step analysis).
As shown in Table 2, the main effect of the organizational justice variables is significant ([Delta] F = 67.208, sig. [Delta] F < .001). The specific main effect coefficient for procedural justice is positive and significant (t = 4.621, p. < .001). The specific main effect coefficient for interactional justice is also positive and significant (t = 4.978, p. < .001.). As shown in Table 2, the interactive effects of the organizational justice variables are not significant for the two-way interactions (F = .793, sig. ? F = .498) or the three-way interaction (F = .789, sig. [Delta] F = .375). Thus, contrary to expectations and to previous organizational justice research in general and organizational justice research in budgeting specifically, there is no interactive effect between procedural justice or interactional justice and distributive justice. Further, distributive justice in budget decision-making is not significant with respect to organizational commitment. Hypotheses Ia, 2a, 2b, and 3 are not supported.
Implications for Scholarly Understanding
Economie theory suggests that bureaucrats are motivated by the amount of budgetary resources received as a result of budget decisionmaking (Niskanen, 1971; see Friedman, 1984, for a summary). However, consistent with other recent organizational justice research on budget decision-making in governmental settings (Magner & Johnson, 1995), the main effect-only results of this study suggests that Federal managers focus unconditionally on the fairness of procedures used in budget decision-making and interpersonal behavior during budget decision-making, and not on the fairness of the actual dollar level of budget resources. Contrary to the predictions of the models based on economic theory, the amount of budgetary resources allocated by the Federal government to the Federal manager does not appear to be important in determining the level of managers' commitment to the Federal government as an employing organization. Indeed, the lack of an interaction between distributive justice and procedural justice may suggest that Federal managers are concerned with the psychological outcomes of budget decision-making such as achieving self-identity and self-esteem rather than with economic outcomes, and thus that Federal managers' behavior follows the group-value model of procedural justice (Ehlen et al., 1999). As explained by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996), under the group-value model, procedural justice is linked to individuals' reaction to organizational decisions because:
.... when procedures are fair, individuals' needs for self-esteem and self-identity are likely to be fulfilled. Furthermore, because procedures are viewed as relatively stable, people should feel reassured that they will continue to have their identity and esteem needs met in the future. Consequently, they are relatively unaffected by the concrete outcomes associated with a current decision, (p. 200)
The lack of an interaction between interactional justice and distributive justice may be similarly based: Federal managers may focus on interpersonal interactions because the presence of certain interpersonal interactions meets social norms and, thus, leads to positive psychological outcomes like self-esteem and self-identity through validating their membership with the Federal government (Ehlen et al., 1999). The lack of an interactive effect between distributive justice and interpersonal justice indicates that interactional justice is not linked to Federal managers' commitment to the Federal government as an employer because certain interpersonal interactions excuse unfavorable economic outcomes for the Federal manager and their specific suborganization.
Also, it is possible that budgets in the Federal government are relatively stable. The chances that budgets differ from expectations may be rare, and, following Adams (1965), it is possible that managers have adjusted their inputs or their referent groups so that there is equity between inputs and outcomes such that distributive justice in budget decision-making no longer impacts organizational behavior. Finally, although not strictly analogous to this study, Kim and Mauborgne (1993) note that procedural justice does not interact uniformly with commitment and other measures of organizational behavior in determining organizational outcomes. Kim and Mauborgne (1993) suggest that procedural justice is a countervailing force where the interests are most divergent. It could be that, through self-selection and sorting in both internal and external labor markets, Federal managers are the subjects most interested in the objectives of the Federal organization and seek validation of that interest through the group-value model of procedural justice and with the existence of procedures or interpersonal communication viewed as fair, rather than on distributive outcomes (Ehlen et al., 1999).
Implications for the Management of the Federal Government
For the management of the Federal government, the main effects only finding of this study indicates that budget decision makers should use fair formal procedures and fair interpersonal behavior to help ensure subordinate managers' commitment to the Federal government as an employer. Accordingly, the Federal government may wish to take steps to ensure that budget decision makers use fair formal procedures, namely, "procedures designed to: a) collect accurate information necessary for making budgetary decisions, b) provide opportunities to appeal or challenge budgetary decisions, c) allow representation to all sides affected by the budget decision, d) make budgetary decisions with consistency, e) provide feedback on budgetary decisions, and f) allow request for clarification or additional information on budgetary decisions" (Moorman, 1991, p. 850; see also Greenberg, 1986; Leventhal, 1980). And, accordingly, the Federal government may wish to take steps to ensure that elements of interactional justice are incorporated into the performance plans of superior Federal managers who make budget decisions to ensure that these managers: "a) consider the viewpoints of subordinate managers when making budget decisions, b) provide timely information about the implications of budget decisions to their subordinate managers, c) treat their subordinate managers with kindness and consideration when making budget decisions, d) show concerns for their subordinate managers' rights when making budget decisions, and e) take steps to deal with subordinate managers in a truthful manner on budget decisions" (Moorman, 1991, p. 850; see also, Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Tyler & Bies, 1990).
Also, since this study has shown that Federal managers are not primarily concerned with the economic outcomes of budget decision-making, those who are concerned with the absolute or relative distribution of actual budget resources - the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and advocacy groups - may not wish to rely on the Federal managers to advance their interests.
Limitations of the Study
The results, the findings and the conclusions of this study need to be interpreted in light of several limitations. First, this study uses crosssectional data, which prevents direct determination of the causal order of the relationships between organizational justice and organizational outcomes (Babbie, 1995; Davis, 1985). second, this study investigates the contribution of organizational justice in the Federal government's budget decisions to Federal manager's organizational commitment, and its results may not be generalizable to other organizations. Third, there could be variables antecedent to organizational justice and organizational commitment, as well as intervening variables, as indicated by the low total R^sup 2^ of .132 for organizational commitment. Fourth, this study uses questionnaires that do not have any reverse-scored items, and the possibility for response bias exists. Fifth, this study uses a commercial third-party mailing list which may contain errors to survey officials at their offices - officials for whom receiving mail may be difficult and for whom responding is not an official duty - and the response rate was 14%, which is lower than the response rate that might be found for surveys with more certain populations, more certain and accessible addresses, and with respondents for whom there are built-in stimuli to respond (Babbie, 1995). Finally, Van den Bos, Vermunt, and Wilke (1997) suggest that the order in which organizational justice information is received may impact fairness judgments, and no provisions are made for determining the order in which respondents received organizational justice information. Nonetheless, as detailed above, this study may have made a significant contribution to the management of the Federal government, scholarly understanding, and theoretical understanding.
Recommendations for Future Research
The results of this study have a number of implications for future research. Future researchers could confirm whether the lack of a normally robust interaction between distributive justice and procedural and interactional justice exists in other government or non-profit organizations. Future researchers could also examine the effect of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice on other measures of organizational behavior, such as intent to turnover, trust in superior or observed budgetary slack.
1. Consistent with recent organizational justice literature (Leung, Chin, & Au, 1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Skarlicki et al., 1999), interactional justice is treated as a separate component of organizational justice, rather than as a subcomponent of procedural justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Libby, 1999; Moorman, 1991); for the purposes of this study, there is no practical effect of labeling these two independent dimensions procedural justice and interactional justice rather than formal procedural justice and interactional procedural justice.
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Andrew Blair Staley, Barbara Dastoor, Nace R. Magner, and Chandler Stolp*
* Andrew Blair Staley, D.B.A., C.P.A., is Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. His primary research interest is in budgetary decision-making. Barbara Dastoor, Ph.D., is Associate Professor, Wayne Huizenga Graduate School of Business and Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern University. Her research focuses on strategic human resources management and organizational behavior. Nace R. Magner, D.B.A., C.M.A., is J.C. Holland Professor of Accountancy, Gordon Ford College of Business, Western Kentucky University. His current research focuses on justice and subordinate participation in organizational budgeting. Chandler Stolp, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Director of the Center for Inter-American Policy Studies, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on western hemispheric economic integration, regional economics, and public sector productivity.…
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Publication information: Article title: The Contribution of Organizational Justice in Budget Decision-Making to Federal Managers' Organizational Commitment. Contributors: Staley, Andrew Blair - Author, Dastoor, Barbara - Author, Magner, Nace R. - Author, Stolp, Chandler - Author. Journal title: Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management. Volume: 15. Issue: 4 Publication date: Winter 2003. Page number: 505. © PrAcademics Press, Florida Atlantic University Spring 2007. Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
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