The End of North Korea

By Davis, Carmel | Naval War College Review, Summer 2000 | Go to article overview

The End of North Korea


Davis, Carmel, Naval War College Review


Eberstadt, Nicholas. The End of North Korea. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1999. 191pp. $14.95

The End of North Korea provides a nuanced and accessible, if wordy, analysis of North Korea's economic situation and political behavior. Nicholas Eberstadt, a visiting scholar at the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and a visiting fellow at the Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, has been watching North Korea for many years. He has written a timely book that will be of particular interest to the policy community.

One of his major themes is that politics decisively dominated economics in North Korea in the past and continues to do so today. Historically, this is visible in North Korea's ambition to unify the Korean Peninsula under its domination, and in the development of a unique form of socialism and a self-reliant economy (juche). Eberstadt argues that until the late 1970s North Korea could reasonably think that an opportunity to unify the peninsula would come its way. South Korean economic growth did not take off until the mid-1960s, its politics were not stable until after 1979, and the U.S. commitment to its defense varied significantly. By the 1970s Kim Il Sung believed that after the unexpected failure of 1950, he had missed a chance to unify the peninsula in 1960; vowing to be ready next time, he tripled the size of the army and devoted much of the nation's resources to the military. The North Korean economy could not sustain this program of war mobilization without external support; the withdrawal of Soviet and Chinese aid in the early 1990s created a trade shock to which North Korea has not adjusted.

The economic collapse has precedents. Eberstadt examines North Korea's current economic situation by comparing it with the shorter but more intense mobilizations of the combatants in World War II; the trade shocks experienced by the American Confederacy, South Africa, Vietnam, Cuba, and Iraq; and the famines early in the communist regimes of the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, and Cambodia. In most cases, economic problems either were shorter in duration (war mobilization) or could be addressed by policy changes (trade shocks and famine).

What is different about North Korea is that its leadership has chosen not to make the policy adjustments that would generate economic growth and feed its people, for fear that economic changes would be politically fatal. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

The End of North Korea
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.