Taking the Protection-Access Tradeoff Seriously
Perlman, Harvey S., Vanderbilt Law Review
Law and economics scholarship has contributed much to our understanding of both the nature of intellectual property rights generally and the features of individual intellectual property regimes. Indeed it is hard to imagine a field other than antitrust law that is so explicitly governed by economic thinking. In authorizing the copyright and patent systems, Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution expressly incorporates a social welfare imperative as the basis for its grant of power.1 Certainly economists and economically oriented legal academics have given the field the attention it is due.
I am far from being a sophisticated economic thinker, although I admire …
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Publication information:
Article title: Taking the Protection-Access Tradeoff Seriously.
Contributors: Perlman, Harvey S. - Author.
Journal title: Vanderbilt Law Review.
Volume: 53.
Issue: 6
Publication date: November 2000.
Page number: 1831+.
© Vanderbilt Law Review Jan 2009.
Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
This material is protected by copyright and, with the exception of fair use, may not be further copied, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means.
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