The Collapse of the Soviet Military

By Huggins, Peter W. | Aerospace Power Journal, Winter 2000 | Go to article overview

The Collapse of the Soviet Military


Huggins, Peter W., Aerospace Power Journal


The Collapse of the Soviet Military by William E. Odom. Yale University Press (http://www.yale. edu/yup), PO. Box 209040, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-9040, 1998, 544 pages, $37.50 (cloth).

William E. Odom, a retired Army general officer and noted scholar of Russian and Soviet affairs, presents a new and compelling book about how and why the Soviet military collapsed and the connection of that event to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a succinct and readable style, Odom illustrates why the Soviet military, once the feared behemoth that threatened western Europe, expired alongside the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

Odom's analytical approach differs from that of many others who came before him. He realizes that a study of any country's military must include the political and economic context and concludes that this is particularly important in the case of Russia and the Soviet Union. By examining the politics, economy, and military of both Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as their interrelationship, Odom draws sound conclusions about the nature of the Soviet military without running the risk of oversimplifying the problem by leaving out important information.

The author sets the stage for his explanation by providing the reader an understanding of the complicated organizational arrangements of the Soviet military, Communist Party, economy, and state. He does so by examining these issues separately in the opening chapters. Odom first explains how one can view Marxism as a theory of war and why Lenin found it compatible with the writings of Clausewitz. After that, he examines the Soviet military's organizational structure, its manpower policies, and military and industrial arrangements that evolved over time.

In the process, Odom stakes out his own position in a number of contentious areas. For example, he concludes that the Soviet Union's goals in the arms-control arena prior to the Gorbachev regime were not concerned with ensuring strategic stability between it and the West. Instead, those goals sought either to mitigate problems in the Soviet economic structure or to retain or increase a military advantage. This runs counter to the two prevailing schools of thought on this issue: Soviet senior leadership, if not the military leadership, accepted US conceptions of strategic stability and deterrence theory, or it never seriously entertained them. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

The Collapse of the Soviet Military
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.