ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XIX. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

By Parker, Richard B. | The Middle East Journal, Autumn 2004 | Go to article overview

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XIX. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967


Parker, Richard B., The Middle East Journal


Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XIX. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, ed. by Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004. 1063 pages. Index to p. 1087. $69.

This long-awaited and important tome, delayed for several years because of reluctance to declassify certain documents dealing with the Liberty case, was released in January 2004 to the accompaniment of an academic conference on the June War held at the Department of State. It contains 542 documents-telegrams, letters, diplomatic notes and memoranda, reporting demarches, conversations, and policy discussions during the six months from May 15 to November 22,1967, when UN security Council Resolution 242 was adopted. The entire volume is available online at http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/. Hardly light reading except for the dedicated policy wonk, it comprises only a fraction of the mountain of paper that this particular crisis generated. Decisions as to what should be included must have been difficult, and keeping the volume within manageable size dictated exclusion of marginal items that might have interested historians. It does not contain much in the way of operational details about what was happening on the ground, so the characters and events are largely two-dimensional.

Researchers will find the book invaluable, and serious students will want to read every page of it. Some serious new books on the subject should result, but the inside story of the diplomatic chaos and the role of various actors as seen by those of us who had to pick up the pieces dropped by our superiors has yet to be written, and it is unlikely that it ever will be, because the actuarial tables are catching up with those of us who were involved at the working level.

The book does not contain any great surprises or revelations, or at least none that I recognized as such, but it does provide interesting insights into a number of queslions of interest to me, and particularly into the progressive erosion of US policy on territorial integrity, which has led to the present log jam in the Holy Land.

In the days before the war started on June 5, and most famously in President Johnson's statement of June 23, 1967, administration officials had repeatedly stressed our continued solemn commitment to the territorial integrity of all the states of the area, meaning Arab as well as Jewish. This commitment had been formalized originally in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, which committed the United States, Britain, and France to take action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent violation of the armistice lines established in 1949. Although the other two signatories, France and Britain, had both repudiated it with their participation in the 1956 invasion of Egypt, the Johnson administration asked them in 1967 to reaffirm their adherence to the declaration and both declined. The administration appeared to consider itself still bound to honor the Tripartite commitment, however, or at least those of us in the field understood our frequent reiteration of statements about territorial integrity as confirming our continued adherence to the declaration. In the final discussion that terminated the conference on the June War held at the Foreign Service Institute in 1992 (see Richard B. Parker (ed.), The Six-Day War, a Retrospective, University Press of Florida), Alfred Atherton raised the following question:

"For eighteen years the United States had the policy of maintaining a structure embedded in the armistice agreements that had at least maintained a status quo and a reasonable amount of stability. Sometime between June 5 and 19, when Johnson made his speech (at Glassboro), there was a major change in US national policy, and I think it would be useful to know how this change happened. It was perhaps logical that we were not going to restore the status quo ante. But that was not necessarily the assumption. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XIX. Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.