Enforcement of Mercosur Arbitration Awards within the Domestic Legal Orders of Member States

By Vinuesa, Raúl Emilio | Texas International Law Journal, Spring 2005 | Go to article overview

Enforcement of Mercosur Arbitration Awards within the Domestic Legal Orders of Member States


Vinuesa, Raúl Emilio, Texas International Law Journal


I. A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO MERCOSUR

The establishment of a common market among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay was the main purpose of the Treaty of Asuncion signed on March 26, 1991.1 The creation of a common market, called the Common Market of the South Cone (Mercosur), implied the need to accomplish the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production between state parties; the establishment of a common external tariff; and the adoption of common trade policies vis-à-vis third states or groups of states. It also involved the coordination of regional as well as international economic and commercial positions and the coordination of macroeconomic and sector policies in different areas such as foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, customs, transport, communications, and any other areas that Member States could agree upon with the aim of ensuring proper competition among them.

The main goals behind Mercosur were tied to the belief that the expansion of Member States' domestic markets, through integration, was a vital prerequisite for accelerating their processes of economic development combined with social justice, and that the integration of large economic areas would secure Member States a proper place in the international economic scene.3

From the very beginning, the establishment of a common market was perceived as an integration process that needed to be strengthened, step-by-step, during successive time periods. In that context, state parties assumed commitments to harmonize in due course their respective internal legislation with recommendations and agreements reached through the intervention of Mercosur organs. Mercosur did not establish supranational institutions.4 Its original institutional organs included a Common Market Council with responsibilities for the political leadership and for decision making in order to ensure compliance with the objectives and time limits set for the final establishment of a common market. The other relevant original organ was the Common Market Group, which was designed to be the executive organ and coordinated by the ministry of foreign affairs of each state party. The basic institutional structure of Mercosur was based on intergovernmental organs with decision-making processes pending consent or close cooperation among the four Member States.5 The common market was based on the reciprocity of rights and obligations between state parties.6 Constant negotiations were then the basic tools for developing a general consensus toward economic integration.

In spite of its institutional structure, Mercosur has been organized on the basis of flexibility and gradual negotiations in order to complete a sound, able economic integration process among Member States.7

II. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

From the very beginning, the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Mercosur rules was foreseen as a provisional and temporary scheme until the main objectives of a common market system could be accomplished.

The Treaty of Asunción determined that during the so-called transition period, which was to last from its entry into force until December 31, 1994, state parties were to adopt a system for the settlement of disputes in order to facilitate the formation of a common market.8

Within 120 days of the entry into force of the Treaty, the Common Market Group was to propose to Member States a system for the settlement of disputes, which was to apply during the transition period.9

Meanwhile, Annex III of the Treaty of Asunción established that any dispute arising between state parties as a result of treaty applications was to be settled by means of direct negotiations. If direct negotiations failed, state parties were to refer the dispute to the Common Market Group, which, after evaluating the situation, was to make recommendations to the parties within sixty days. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Enforcement of Mercosur Arbitration Awards within the Domestic Legal Orders of Member States
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.