The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton. Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina

By Paczulla, Jutta | International Journal, Winter 2004 | Go to article overview

The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton. Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina


Paczulla, Jutta, International Journal


AS THE YEAR 1995 CAME TO A CLOSE, with people around the globe in festive spirits chiming in the new year, a drama was unfolding in Bosnia that was anything but festive. The world observed, through the eyes of CNN, how a US army engineering battalion tried to cross the Sava River from Croatia into Bosnia, setting up pontoon bridges to pave the way for entry into Bosnia by the NATO implementation force (IFOR). The crossing, conducted in poor weather conditions, took days longer than anticipated. One could observe the engineers and troops battling nature in the form of mud and dirt on the banks of the Sava River. The operation symbolized a new beginning for the war-torn state of Bosnia. International support, especially American, had been pledged for the implementation of peace. The Dayton accords, the basis for this new engagement, had been signed only weeks earlier, initialled by the warring factions at Wright-Patterson air force base in Dayton, Ohio, on 21 November 1995 and officially signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The Sava River crossing, difficult as it was, also symbolized the long, hard, and awkward road that led to Dayton.

The wars that occurred in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia were the most ferocious conflicts on European soil since the Second World War. Identified as "ethnic conflicts," the fighting in the Balkans exhibited complex ideological, religious, and ethnic roots, with historical grievances mixed up in all aspects. The Dayton peace process, under discussion here, focused on the situation in Bosnia. In the period between May 1992 and December 1995, Bosnia was the battleground for three ethnic groups, the Bosnian Muslims,1 comprising 43.7 percent of the Bosnian population, the Bosnian Serbs who represented 31.4 percent, and the Bosnian Croats, with a strength of 17.3 percent.2 The complicated origins of the war lay in part in the attempt by the Bosnian Serbs to break up Bosnia and link the areas which contained Serb ethnic majorities to the larger entity of Serbia. The goal was the establishment of what Serb propagandists called "Greater Serbia." The Bosnian Serbs rejected the alternative of becoming part of a unified, independent state of Bosnia, whose government would likely be dominated by the Muslims. The Bosnian Muslims, in turn, feared that they themselves would be dominated by Serbia if they were to remain in a rump Yugoslavia whose ethnic balance had been upset by the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. The Bosnian Muslims, after pursuing independence, consistently fought to retain a unified Bosnian state, a state that would include the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, but which would give the Muslims enhanced control of the government due to their relative population strength. These sets of incompatible visions, while not telling the complete story, were at the heart of the intra-ethnic Bosnian conflict.

By the time the Dayton peace initiative came to fruition, after four years of war, more than half of Bosnia's 4.3 million citizens had been displaced, either as refugees in host countries (1.2 million) or as internally displaced persons in Bosnia (1 million); roughly 250,000 were estimated dead or missing; and more than 200,000 were wounded, including 50,000 children. Physical and economic losses were severe, with total replacement costs of Bosnia's destroyed assets estimated by the World Bank at between US$15 billion and US$20 billion.3

How could this dire calamity, taking place in Europe in the 1990s, continue for four years and not be halted until 1995? It must be noted that at no stage in the period between 1992 and 1995 did any of the warring parties themselves take an initiative, or express their intention, to settle the conflict.4 The responsibility for making peace was passed to international actors. In order to understand why it took so long for the international community to develop a coherent Bosnia strategy, it is worth examining briefly the diplomatic overtures and peace initiatives that were conducted during the period from 1992 to 1995. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton. Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.