MUSLIM MINDANAO: Four Years after the Peace Agreement

Southeast Asian Affairs, January 1, 2001 | Go to article overview

MUSLIM MINDANAO: Four Years after the Peace Agreement


R.J. May

In September 1996, the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed a Peace Agreement. At the time there were many who hailed the agreement as bringing to an end a conflict between Muslim and Christian Filipinos which had begun with Spanish settlement in the Philippine islands in the sixteenth century but had entered a new, violent phase in the early 1970s.

Such optimism, however, was poorly founded. For one thing, the Agreement, which was subtitled "The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement" [between the Government of the Philippines and the MNLF], covered the thirteen provinces which constituted the MNLF's minimum territorial demand for an autonomous "Bangsa Moro" (or Moro Nation). Already by 1976, only five of these provinces contained a Muslim majority population and in 1977, and again in 1987, attempts to promote a peaceful settlement through the establishment of an autonomous region had failed when autonomy was rejected, in mandated plebiscites, by the non-Muslim majority in most of the thirteen provinces. In 1996, the holding of a plebiscite was postponed, but the requirement that a plebiscite eventually be held hung over the newly established Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and its Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). Secondly, the 1996 Peace Agreement was specifically between the Government of the Philippines and the MNLF. It did not include the other major Moro faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which vowed to maintain the armed struggle for an independent Bangsa Moro. Thirdly, it was clear, even in 1996, that the Philippine Government and the SPCPD were not going to be able to meet the exaggerated developmental expectations of the Philippine Muslims, and that the promised integration of former Bangsa Moro Army guerrillas into the Armed Forces of the Philippines was unlikely to proceed smoothly.

In the event, even the sceptics might have been disappointed at the way things have developed since 1996.

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

MUSLIM MINDANAO: Four Years after the Peace Agreement
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.