Rumors were current late in 1936 and throughout 1937 that American diplomats, their aloofness and near estrangement during the past four years notwithstanding, planned to intervene in the diplomatic affairs of the Old World. Norman Davis, now far more against German policy than he had been in 1933, thought that an effort by Roosevelt to halt the arms race, or to secure an international embargo against an aggressor, would be futile. "It is not possible to reason with Dictators like Hitler or Mussolini," he wrote Hull in November 1936, "who have a frankenstein that forces them to keep on the move."1 A month later, from Warsaw, Ambassador John Cudahy worriedly wrote Roosevelt that a Wilsonian pronouncement would be forgotten in two weeks, and it would be a grave mistake to intervene without a program to improve economic conditions in Germany, where "a proud, capable, ambitious and warlike people . . . are denied a full and happy life while . . . the Russians, crude and uncouth, three hundred years, behind present day civilization, are in possession of the wealth of an empire. The day of reckoning is coming on this issue." Roosevelt replied that he agreed with Cudahy's conclusions, but reassured him that he did not contemplate "any move of any kind in Europe--certainly under the conditions of the moment."2 When a few European diplomats in January 1937 approached William Bullitt, now ambassador to France, to inquire if____________________
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Publication information: Book title: American Appeasement:United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933-1938. Contributors: Arnold A. Offner - Author. Publisher: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Place of publication: Cambridge, MA. Publication year: 1969. Page number: 175.
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