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Arms Control and European Security

By: Graeme P. Auton | Book details

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more than four decades now, even if some unilateral U. S. reductions take place. The present level of NATO conventional capabilities might be expensive, but it is hardly burdensome. Given the changes that may be taking place on the other side of the continent, it would be prudent for the Western powers to deploy military forces that deter while preserving the capacity to maintain continental stability. Arms control is not an end in itself, but--rather--one means of moving toward a more stable and secure international system. Arms control that destabilizes, as some conventional-force reductions well might, is worse than no arms control at all. Western governments must approach the CFE and CSBM processes with a degree of circumspection; they must not be determined to make these processes "succeed" at any cost simply because public sentiment in the West--as a result of the Gorbachev initiatives--now embraces a substantially diminished perception of the potential Soviet threat.


NOTES
1.
See Survival 24, no. 5 ( September-October 1987): pp. 463-65.
2.
See the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control, NATO, 11 December 1986. Also the Statement on Conventional Arms Control issued 2-3 March 1988 and reprinted in Survival 30, no. 3. ( May-June 1988): pp. 275-78.
3.
News and Views from the USSR, 13 April 1987 ( Washington, D.C.: Soviet Embassy). This approach was latter confirmed in the 29 May 1987 Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, partially reprinted in Survival 24, no. 5 ( September-October 1987): pp. 465-66.
4.
See Robert D. Blackwill, "Conventional Stability Talks: Specific Approaches to Conventional Arms Control in Europe," Survival 30, no. 5 ( September-October 1988): p. 431.
5.
See Los Angeles Times, 8 December 1988, pp. 1, 28.
6.
On MBFR, see John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe ( New York: Pergamon, 1980); and Coit D. Blacker, "The MBFR Experience," in Alexander L. George , Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 123-43. For an early account that anticipated many of the issues that later paralyzed MBFR, see John N. Yochelson, "MFR: West European and American Perspectives," in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., The United States and Western Europe: Political, Economic and Strategic Perspectives ( Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1974), pp. 251-81.
7.
On CDE, see John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference ( Washington & London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988); and James E. Goodby, "The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security System for Europe," in George Farley, & Dallin, U.S.-Soviet Security, pp. 144-72.
8.
France has consistently refused to participate in MBFR. As Edward Ko

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