Power and Madness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion

By Edward Rhodes | Go to book overview

NOTES

Introduction
1.
Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1979), vol. 2, no. 4. The remark was made at a conference on the future of NATO held in Brussels on September 1-3, 1979.
2.
Many persuasive--though frequently irreconcilable--policy pieces have been written in the past few years predicting and prescribing futures for the American security guarantee to NATO. Among those worth serious review are: McGeorge Bundy , George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1982), vol. 60, no. 4; Robert J. Art, "Fixing Atlantic Bridges," Foreign Policy (Spring 1982), no. 46; Karl Kaiser , Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1982), vol. 60, no. 5; Hedley Bull, "European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1983), vol. 61, no. 4; Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Foreign Policy (Spring 1984), no. 54; and John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," International Security (Winter 1984-85), vol. 9, no. 3. Perhaps the most provocative recent piece, however, is David Garnham, "Extending Deterrence with German Nuclear Weapons," International Security (Summer 1985), vol. 10, no. 1. See also the interesting collection of articles: John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds., Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question ( Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983).
3.
Among the best contributions to this debate are: Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," Foreign Affairs ( October 1973), vol. 52, no. 1; Herbert Scoville Jr., "Flexible MADness," Foreign Policy (Spring 1974), no. 14; Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense," Foreign Affairs ( July 1974), vol. 52, no. 4; George W. Rathjens, "Flexible Response Options," Orbis (Fall 1974), vol. 18, no. 3; Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Policy (Winter 1976-77), no. 25; Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," Political Science Quarterly (Winter 1979-80), vol. 94, no. 4; Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory IsPossible,"

-231-

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Power and Madness: The Logic of Nuclear Coercion
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Acknowledgments ix
  • INTROOUCTION 1
  • 1 - Mad and the Nuclear Deterrence Problem 19
  • 2 - Rationality and Irrationality 47
  • 3 - Coercive Power and Coercive Strategies 82
  • 4 - Credible Commitment and Modes of Commitment 107
  • 5 - Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Limitation 135
  • 6 - Doomsday Machines 155
  • 7 - Coercion and Contingently Irrational Behavior 171
  • 8 - Theory and Policy 203
  • Notes 231
  • Index 265
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