Revitalizing Antitrust in Its Second Century: Essays on Legal, Economic, and Political Policy

Table of contents

• Title Page iii
• COPYRIGHT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v
• Contents vii
• Acknowledgements xi
• Contributors xiii
• Introduction xvii
• NOTES xix
• Part I Setting the Stage 1
• Part I Setting the Stage 2
• NOTES 26
• Chapter 2 Theories of Industrial Organization 57
• Chapter 3 Anchoring Antitrust Economics -- A Lexicon 82
• Part II Antitrust and a Dynamic Economy 91
• NOTES 93
• Chapter 4 the Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress 95
• N0TES 119
• Chapter 5 Antitrust, Efficiency, and Progress 130
• CONCLUSION 147
• CONCLUSION 148
• Chapter 6 Antitrust and Enforceability: An Empirical Perspective 156
• Chapter 7 Law and Enforceability: A Litigator's Perspective 167
• Part III The Creation and Uses of Economic Power 169
• Predation, Exclusion, and Efficiency 171
• Chapter 9 Containing Section 2 209
• Chapter 10 Delimiting Antitrust 211
• NOTES 237
• Chapter 11 Against Orthodoxy 248
• Chapter 12 The Dangerousness of Power 252
• Chapter 13 Competition Chasing the Tail of Efficiency 257
• Chapter 14 Abuse of a Dominant Position and Exclusionary Practices: A European View 265
• Chapter 15 Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: the Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes 271
• NOTES 288
• Chapter 16 Economics of Vertical Arrangements 315
• Chapter 17 Vertical Restraints: Flynn, Ponsoldt, Comanor, and the Sea of Doubt 322
• Chapter 18 Competitors' Collaboration -- A Methodology for Analysis 331
• Part IV Barriers to Entry and Global Competition 335
• NOTES 336
• Chapter 19 Ease of Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied Too Readily? 347
• Chapter 20 Foreign Competitors and Potential Competition: Geographic Market Definition in an International Context 349
• APPENDIX 367
• APPENDIX 369
• Part V Tempering Antitrust with Industrial Policy? 379
• NOTES 380
• Chapter 21 Modifying Antitrust to Meet International Competition: The Case of Semiconductors 402
• Chapter 22 Putting the Brakes on the Merger Movement -- Antitrust, Yes; Industrial Policy, No 446
• Part VI Antitrust in its Second Century 449
• NOTE 450
• Chapter 23 Congress and Antitrust Policy After the Reagan Administration 451
• NOTES 483
• Chapter 24: Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the 1990s 484
• Chapter 25: The Case for Federal Uniformity 516
• Chapter 26: Business Judgment v. Antitrust Justice--The Forgotten Private Plainti ff 519
• Chapter 27 - Does Antitrust Have a Future? 535
• Conclusion 538
• NOTE 538
• Index 539

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