Baseball Economics: Current Research

By John Fizel; Elizabeth Gustafson et al. | Go to book overview

the clubs. This has led many to suspect that the arbitrators are not basing their decisions on the merits of the case but, rather, that they are randomly distributing victories between the two sides to avoid veto.

In fact, the nature of the arbitration game leads each side to submit a reasonable offer. Therefore, the more closely the opposing offers are to the arbitrators' preferred awards, the more it appears that the arbitrators are simply flipping coins.

Our results show that arbitrators do not flip coins, but rely on the facts of the cases when rendering decisions. Further, although negotiated settlements appear to be unbiased estimates of the preferred awards for pitchers, such does not appear to be the case for hitters.


NOTES
1.
Another study by Faurot and McAllister ( 1992) attempted to model baseball salary arbitration preferred awards. Although they claimed to have uncovered the arbitrators' decision rule, they were unable to get their qualitative choice estimation to converge.
2.
In the context of maximizing one's expected gains from arbitration, if FOA decisions truly were random, the incentive for each side would be to submit more extreme offers. In fact, given that baseball's opposing offers are highly correlated with one another (see Appendix 8.1), casual evidence suggests that the parties believe the arbitrators consider the merits of each case.
3.
From 1974 until 1987, two years of service were required for eligibility. After 1987, three years of service were necessary. Finally, beginning in 1990, all three-year players were eligible, and of those with between two and three years of experience, the 17% with the most service were also eligible.
4.
The exception is for those players with at least six years of experience. Although some of these individuals may also be eligible for arbitration, the decision to invoke the procedure must be mutually agreed on by the player and his club.
5.
Marburger ( 1993) showed that arbitrators may think alike even if they do not overtly attempt to replicate each other.
6.
Prior to 1981, there is evidence of significant arbitrator learning in the context of Gibbons ( 1988). Specifically, the Bruce Sutter case in 1980 dramatically increased the earning potential of arbitration-eligible players relative to ineligible players. The Steve Kemp case one year later reinforced the role that free-agent salaries would play in arbitration cases.
7.
Our estimation included a set of annual dummy variables. The coefficients for the constant term and the yearly dummy variables are not shown in the tables, but are available on request from the authors.
8.
The positive values of the log likelihood functions in Table 8.2 are not erroneous. The log likelihood values of the unconstrained regression models for both hitters and pitchers were positive. This is possible, albeit uncommon, when the value of d is less than one.

-109-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Baseball Economics: Current Research
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 230

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.