Some of them want to eliminate consciousness, others accept its existence for various reasons.
The existence of several philosophical and psychological theories about consciousness further indicates that the much-discussed pairwise contrast between folk psychology and neuroscience is misleading, because it is only a special case of the relevant issues. This comparison is inspired by the Sellarsian distinction between the manifest image and the scientific image. The radical eliminativism urges us to substitute scientific objects for the ordinary things of common sense experience; thereby the entities of folk physics and folk psychology will be eliminated. However, to be successful, the matured neuroscience of an eliminative materialist should not only replace beliefs, desires, pain, and so forth as they are ordinarily understood in everyday life, but it should eliminate also their successor concepts as they are presented in our best theories of cognitive psychology (cf. Revonsuo, 1993). It is not enough for neuroscience to supersede common sense, but it should compete with the advanced theories of cognitive psychology as well.
Given this multitude of rival theoretical approaches, it seems to me that we cannot yet apply scientia mensura to decide metaphysical controversies by scientific theories. Rather we still tend to choose our favorite type of scientific theory on the basis of our philosophical standpoint. But at the same time, with mutual cooperation between philosophy and science, we can reasonably hope to make cognitive progress by finding philosophically interesting and empirically testable psychological theories.
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Publication information: Book title: Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Contributors: Antti Revonsuo - Editor, Matti Kamppinen - Editor. Publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Place of publication: Hillsdale, NJ. Publication year: 1994. Page number: 49.