Missile Defenses and Western European Security: NATO Strategy, Arms Control, and Deterrence

By Robert M. Soofer | Go to book overview

It is not surprising, then, that the Presidium of the SPD called upon the FRG to "say an unequivocal no to any participation in the space-armament plans of the Reagan administration."60 The Strategic Defense Initiative is viewed by the SPD as another unilateral and technological security measure that is unlikely to contribute to the "security partnership." SDI upsets the security partnership by exacerbating first-strike and arms race instabilities as well as cultivating political tension and mistrust.

The SPD fears that the deployment of strategic defenses, which will always be less than perfect, will spur both sides to increase their offensive and defensive forces. Furthermore, any erosion or termination of the ABM Treaty would probably put an end to any arms control negotiations for a long time.61 SPD support for the ABM Treaty is based not so much on evidence of the treaty's strategic usefulness, as it is on the belief that the treaty is living proof that arms control and détente are viable. Josef Joffe, former editor of Die Zeit, explained German support for the SALT II Treaty in similar terms: "The Bonn government has praised SALT II so compulsively not because it is wildly enthusiastic about the substance of the agreement, but because it is obsessed with the political consequences of its rejection. . . . Having hitched its electoral fortunes to Ostpolitik and reconciliation, the SPD is condemned to demonstrate forever the viability of détente, for the sake of its survival in power."62


CONCLUSION

Any review of a country's arms control attitudes compels the making of simplified and sometimes distorted assumptions. The image of collective European will blinded by "arms control fever" is a distorted characterization. As the above references to official arms control policy in the countries examined indicate, conservative governments in Europe recognize the role of arms control in Western security to be one that cannot substitute for adequate defense preparation. Due to the "politicization" of arms control, however, these governments must continue to appear to have faith in the arms control process.

For many Europeans, however, the following SPD statement captures the essence of the security paradigm from which they evaluate most security policies:

For German and European interests, there is no alternative to the continuation and deepening of the policy of détente. Détente is the overriding political instrument in order to achieve a European peace order of security [sic].63

For those operating under such a conceptual framework--and there are many in Europe--the arms control process and its centerpiece, the ABM Treaty, is the basis for the "security partnership" between the East and West.

-83-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Missile Defenses and Western European Security: NATO Strategy, Arms Control, and Deterrence
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Recent Titles in Contributions in Military Studies Series Advisor: Colin Gray ii
  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Tables ix
  • Acknowledgments xi
  • Acronyms xiii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1- Western European Reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative 11
  • Notes 25
  • 2- Western Europe and The First Abm Debate: 1965-72 29
  • Notes 37
  • 3- Sdi and Deterrence: A Western European Perspective 39
  • Notes 65
  • 4- Western European Arms Control Perspectives And Sdi 69
  • Conclusion 83
  • 5- Sdi and Western European Support for The Abm Treaty 87
  • Conclusion 99
  • 6- Antitactical Missile Defense, Western Europe, and the Inf Treaty 103
  • Notes 119
  • 7- Antitactical Missile Defense and Nato Strategy 123
  • Conclusion 142
  • Notes 143
  • 8- Summary and Conclusion 147
  • Bibliography 161
  • Index 171
  • About the Author 175
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 178

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.