Cited page

Citations are available only to our active members. Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

X X

Cited page

Display options
Reset

Firms, Organizations and Contracts: A Reader in Industrial Organization

By: Peter J. Buckley; Jonathan Michie | Book details

Contents
Look up
Saved work (0)

matching results for page

Page 168
Why can't I print more than one page at a time?
While we understand printed pages are helpful to our users, this limitation is necessary to help protect our publishers' copyrighted material and prevent its unlawful distribution. We are sorry for any inconvenience.

6 Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations

Oliver E. Williamson

The new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs. Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting. But despite the growing realization that transaction costs are central to the study of economics, 1 skeptics remain. Stanley Fischer's complaint is typical: "Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device . . . [partly] because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified transaction costs.' 2 Put differently, there are too many degrees of freedom; the concept wants for definition.

Among the factors on which there appears to be developing a general consensus are: (1) opportunism is a central concept in the study of transaction costs; 3 (2) opportunism is especially important for economic activity that involves transaction-specific investments in human and physical capital; 4 (3) the efficient processing of information is an important and related concept; 5 and (4) the assessment of transaction costs is a comparative institutional undertaking. 6 Beyond these general propositions, a consensus on transaction costs is lacking.

____________________
This paper has benefited from support from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the National Science Foundation. Helpful comments by Yoram Ben-Porath, Richard Nelson, Douglass North, Thomas Palay, Joseph Sax, David Teece, and Peter Temin and from the participants at seminars at the Yale Law School and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton are gratefully acknowledged. The paper was rewritten to advantage after reading Ben-Porath's discussion paper, the F-Connection: Family, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange, and Temin's discussion paper, Modes of Economic Behavior: Variations on Themes of J. R. Hicks and Herbert Simon.

-168-

Select text to:

Select text to:

  • Highlight
  • Cite a passage
  • Look up a word
Learn more Close
Loading One moment ...
of 482
Highlight
Select color
Change color
Delete highlight
Cite this passage
Cite this highlight
View citation

Are you sure you want to delete this highlight?