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Firms, Organizations and Contracts: A Reader in Industrial Organization

By: Peter J. Buckley; Jonathan Michie | Book details

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Page 473
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6.
These are one-period contracts that can be made contingent on anything that is common knowledge at the end of the period.
7.
Sufficient conditions are that there is common knowledge of preferences and productive opportunities at renegotiation dates and that there is no lower bound on the utility of consumption.
8.
See Sutton ( 1986) and Rubinstein ( 1987) for surveys.
9.
Of course, if the interests of future generations are not represented in decisions that affect them, there is the familiar potential for an inefficiency arising from externalities.
10.
See Fama and Jensen ( 1983) for a related view of the separation of powers and responsibilities within organizations.
11.
They wrote: 'I can "punish" you only by withholding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all an employer can do. He can fire or sue, just as I can fire my grocer by stopping purchases from him or sue him for delivering faulty products'. This view overlooks substantial differences, perhaps most importantly that an employee typically works exclusively for his employer, which helps alleviate the problems of common agency.

References

Alchian Armen and Harold Demsetz ( 1972), "'Production, information costs, and economic organization'", American Economic Review, 62: 777-95.

Arrow Kenneth ( 1974), The Limits of Organization ( New York: Norton).

Baron James N. ( 1987), "The employment relation as a social relation'", Journal of Japanese and International Economics (forthcoming).

Baron David and David Besanko ( 1987), "'Commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship'", Review of Economic Studies (forthcoming).

Chandler Alfred ( 1977), The Visible Hand ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Coase Ronald ( 1937), 'The nature of the firm', Economica, 4: 386-405.

Fama Eugene and Michael Jensen ( 1983), "'The separation of ownership and control'", Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301-25

Fudenberg Drew, Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom ( 1987), "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships'", unpublished paper.

Fudenberg Drew and Eric Maskin ( 1986), 'The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information', Econometrica, 54: 533-54.

Galbraith Jay R. ( 1977), Organization Design ( Reading, PA: Addison-Welsey).

Goetz Charles and Robert Scott ( 1981), "'Principles of relational contracts'", Virginia Law Review, 67: 1089-150.

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