spection issues were largely unproblematic, the United States created the conditions for the LTBT. By the same token, Kennedy's June 1963 announcement
of a unilateral American test moratorium is widely credited with improving the
political conditions of the LTBT endgame. Initiatives, however, were more frequently used by the Soviet side.
On the two occasions when the prospects for a comprehensive treaty brightened, the late 1950s and the late 1970s, progress in the negotiations was halted
or reversed when American negotiators retracted standing offers, substantially
revised their positions, or presented new and more demanding proposals. From
the point of view of moving negotiations toward agreement, the U.S. use of
tough strategy tactics was counterproductive. Notably, in the second instance,
Soviet negotiators did not reciprocate the American behavior. Instead, they
maintained the positions they had presented by 1978 on inspection and duration. Thus, if initiatives did not always succeed, they at least promoted progress,
while tough strategies consistently obstructed agreement.
Finally, within those negotiations that led to agreement, the role of reciprocal
behavior is clear. Both U.S. and Soviet negotiators responded in something similar to tit-for-tat in the bargaining for the LTBT, TTBT, and PNET agreements.
1. See Bernard Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control ( Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 1961); John Barton and
Lawrence Weiler, eds., International
Arms Control ( Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Seyom Brown, The Faces of
Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan
( New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Robert Divine, Blowing on the Wind
( New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 2.
See Michael Bechloss, MayDay: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair ( New York: Harper and Row, 1986).
For discussions of these negotiations generally, see Ivo H. Daalder, "The Limited
Test Ban Treaty," in Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight, ed.
Richard Haass ( Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987); P. Terrence Hopmann, "Internal and External Influences on Bargaining in Arms Control Negotiations," in Peace,
War and Number, ed.
Bruce Russett ( Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Harold Jacobson and Eric Stein, Diplomats Scientists and Politicians ( Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1966); Christer Jönsson, Soviet Bargaining Behavior ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Alan Neidle, "Nuclear Test Bans: History, Future and Prospects," in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, ed.
Philip J. Farley, and
Alexander Dallin ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
( Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); and Glenn Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and the
Test Ban ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
Stein, Diplomats. Scientists and Politicians, pp. 277-278.
See Herbert F. York, "The Great Test Ban Debate," in Arms Control: Readings
from "Scientific American" ( New York: W. H. Freeman, 1980).
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Stepping Back:Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War.
Contributors: William B. Vogele - Author.
Publisher: Praeger Publishers.
Place of publication: Westport, CT.
Publication year: 1994.
Page number: 45.
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