Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War

spection issues were largely unproblematic, the United States created the conditions for the LTBT. By the same token, Kennedy's June 1963 announcement of a unilateral American test moratorium is widely credited with improving the political conditions of the LTBT endgame. Initiatives, however, were more frequently used by the Soviet side.

On the two occasions when the prospects for a comprehensive treaty brightened, the late 1950s and the late 1970s, progress in the negotiations was halted or reversed when American negotiators retracted standing offers, substantially revised their positions, or presented new and more demanding proposals. From the point of view of moving negotiations toward agreement, the U.S. use of tough strategy tactics was counterproductive. Notably, in the second instance, Soviet negotiators did not reciprocate the American behavior. Instead, they maintained the positions they had presented by 1978 on inspection and duration. Thus, if initiatives did not always succeed, they at least promoted progress, while tough strategies consistently obstructed agreement.

Finally, within those negotiations that led to agreement, the role of reciprocal behavior is clear. Both U.S. and Soviet negotiators responded in something similar to tit-for-tat in the bargaining for the LTBT, TTBT, and PNET agreements.

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