Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War

By William B. Vogele | Go to book overview

6
Negotiating the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

The first major arms control achievement of the 1980s was the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. 1 Signed by Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in Washington on 8 December 1987, the INF Treaty marked a dramatic departure from both the tenor of arms control bargaining only a few years earlier and from the major treaties of the past. Unlike SALT II, which sought primarily to regulate the arms race in strategic offensive weapons, the INF Treaty committed both sides to dismantle and destroy all land-based nuclear missiles with flight ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This meant eliminating a total of 2,695 missiles, plus their launchers and support facilities. Many of these missiles were no more than ten years old. For the United States, the 689 Pershing 2 IRBMs and ground launched cruise missiles that were to be destroyed had only been deployed since December 1983. These American missiles, plus the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), had been at the heart of tension and controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union, and among the American and West European publics, for the first half of the decade. The Soviet missiles had become evidence to conservative political forces in the United States and Europe that Soviet leaders would exploit the loopholes of political détente and would actively seek military advantage over NATO. Imminent deployment of the American missiles rallied a quiescent peace movement in the United States and Western Europe, the activists being concerned with the missiles as symbols of the dangerous excesses of a continuing nuclear arms race. Politically, conservative parties controlled the governments of the three key NATO countries, the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany. Peace movements mobilized popular power in the streets and through local politics and referendum campaigns. In the end, no small amount of political capital was spent to deploy the very missiles that were to be systematically destroyed under the INF Treaty.

-89-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Stepping Back: Nuclear Arms Control and the End of the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Acknowledgments ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • 1 - Security, Cooperation, and Arms Control 1
  • Notes 13
  • 2 - Bargaining and Cooperation 17
  • Notes 30
  • 3 - Controlling Nuclear Testing: 1954-1980 35
  • Notes 45
  • 4 - Negotiating Limits on Nuclear Testing: 1981-1992 47
  • Notes 62
  • 5 - Negotiating Limits on Strategic Nuclear Forces: 1954-1980 67
  • 6 - Negotiating the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 89
  • Notes 100
  • 7 - Strategic Arms Reduction Talks: 1982-1991 105
  • Notes 130
  • 8 - Stepping Back from the Cold War 135
  • Notes 148
  • Selected Bibliography 151
  • Index 161
  • About the Author 167
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 172

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.