The Superpowers and Nuclear Arms Control: Rhetoric and Reality

By Dennis Menos | Go to book overview

Israel's nuclear program, especially the reactor at Dimona, which serves as its lead installation, has not gone unnoticed here or abroad. But the United States, traditionally a champion of Israeli interests, has refused to take action that might be regarded as inimical to Israel or as challenging its nuclear advances. At most, the United States has urged "restraint," 44 suggesting also that the Israeli weapons not be tested. It has done this despite a national policy that proclaims nonproliferation as a priority objective and the obvious fact that American national interests dictate that the Middle East, of all areas in the world, remain free of nuclear weapons.

In summary, forty-four years after Hiroshima and four decades after the knowledge of the bomb's dreadful potential for ending civilization, the two leading powers of the day are engaged in the process of accumulating weapons as never before in history. There is no rational purpose for these weapons. The superpowers already have enough on hand to deter each other a thousand times over.

The weapons currently being acquired by the superpowers are clearly designed for first-strike purposes. Their mission is to execute with impunity a disarming first strike and to deny the other side the capability and will to retaliate. Success in a first strike, however, cannot be assured without the availability of a defensive shield (i.e., SDI) to protect the friendly forces against the possibility of retaliation. This is the area the superpowers are focusing on next, to the detriment of their own security and the future of all civilization.


NOTES
1.
The total number of fatalities resulting from a nuclear war would depend on how and by whom the war was initiated and how it is fought. In his book 1999: Victory without War ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), former President Nixon estimated that more than 400 million people in the United States and the Soviet Union would be killed in an all-out nuclear exchange.
2.
United Nations General Assembly, Study on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures ( New York: United Nations, May 19, 1988), p. 20.
3.
The basic military strategy of the United States, notes the FY 1989 Military Posture statement by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to "deter war . . . and if necessary defeat aggression across the entire spectrum of military conflict."
4.
A "first strike" is a nuclear attack carried out at such devastatingly high levels of violence as to destroy an opponent's capability to launch a major counterstrike or to even continue in the conflict.
5.
Michio Kaku and Daniel Axelrod, To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon's Secret War Plans ( Boston: South End Press, 1987), pp. 273-78.
7.
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat, 1988 ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 48.

-21-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Superpowers and Nuclear Arms Control: Rhetoric and Reality
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Preface ix
  • Abbreviations xiii
  • 1 - Enough is Never Enough 1
  • Notes 21
  • 2 - The Superpowers 25
  • Notes 45
  • 3 - The Impotent Opposition 49
  • Notes 67
  • 4 - Tearing Down the Few Past Accomplishments 71
  • Notes 90
  • 5 - The Politics of Arms Control 95
  • 6 - The Endless Negotiations 123
  • Notes 141
  • Appendixes 145
  • Selected Excerpts 155
  • Selected Bibliography 165
  • Index 173
  • About the Author 181
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 182

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.