The Superpowers and Nuclear Arms Control: Rhetoric and Reality

By Dennis Menos | Go to book overview
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suggestion is for the superpowers to waive for a period of ten years their rights under Article XV (i.e., the right to give notice and withdraw from the treaty). This, too, is judged by the United States as a Soviet ploy designed to deny it the option of deploying SDI.

During the Washington Summit in December 1987, the superpowers confirmed once again their desire to hang on to the ABM treaty a while longer but, they hope, not for very long. They did this by using the most ambiguous language ever in their final communiqué. Evidence also the title of a space treaty proposed by the United States soon after the summit: Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on Certain Measures to Facilitate the Cooperative Transition to the Deployment of Future Strategic Ballistic Missile Defenses. 68


NOTES
1.
A principal goal of the INF treaty was to convey to the world an aura of arms control momentum. The treaty addressed none of the critical arms control issues of the day, left the strategic arsenals of the superpowers intact, and even allowed the removal and reuse of the nuclear warheads from the delivery vehicles that were eliminated. See also George F. Will, "Is This Arms Control?" Washington Post, September 24, 1987.
2.
White House, Office of Press Secretary, The President's Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements ( Washington, DC, January 23, 1984), and subsequent reports.
3.
Kenneth L. Adelman, Is Arms Control at a Dead End? Current Policy no. 837 ( Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, May 16, 1986).
4.
The SALT 11 proportionate response decision of May 1986, which in effect killed the SALT 11 treaty, was defended by the United States exclusively on the Soviet record of arms treaty noncompliance.
5.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report to the Congress, 1987 ( Washington, DC: U.S. ACDA, February 24, 1988), pp. 69-71; and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements: The President's Report to the Congress, Special Report no. 175 ( Washington, DC, December 2, 1987), pp. 2-3.
6.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, p. 6.
7.
In line with their policy of greater openness, the Soviets have been easing some of their formerly very restrictive rules governing travel to sensitive military areas. Thus on September 5, 1987, a U.S. congressional delegation was allowed to inspect the radar facility in Krasnoyarsk; a month later another U.S. delegation was permitted to visit and observe the Soviet chemical facility at Shikhany.
8.
Listed in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).

-90-

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