interests. It now faces security challenges that do not directly threaten U.S. survival but are nevertheless vital to U.S. global interests. Thus, military power will be used primarily for coercive purposes in support of diplomacy. In the words of Defense Secretary William Perry, " Oliver Cromwell once said that a man-of-war is the best ambassador. That's not really quite true. As the negotiations with North Korea proved, the best approach is a good ambassador backed up by a man-of-war."
President Clinton acknowledged his own learning curve. In an interview with Time on 31 October 1994, the president said regarding foreign policy, "I've completely stopped [talking on the fly] . . . I think, tactically, we are making better moves. We're doing it better; we're making fewer mistakes. Part of that is, I think, just learning." The conventional wisdom is that President Clinton will have no choice other than "morphing" himself into a foreign policy president while redefining U.S. interests in the post-Cold War world. This evolution would be predicated on a "Clinton Doctrine"--an overriding set of principles to guide U.S. foreign policy. At this point, such a paradigm is still in the making.
We want to thank the following people for their helpful comments: Bruce Jentleson, Miroslav Nincic, Bertjan Verbeek, and the editors. We want also to thank our research assistant, Cyndi Boaz.
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Publication information: Book title: The Clinton Presidency:First Appraisals. Contributors: Colin Campbell - Editor, Bert A. Rockman - Editor. Publisher: Chatham House Publishers. Place of publication: Chatham, NJ. Publication year: 1996. Page number: 319.
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