SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS
Combatants : The Private Manufacture of Combatants : Conscript Armies : Conscription and the Treaty of Versailles : Short Term Service : Combatant Conversion Lag : Types of Combatants : Officers' Training Corps : Infantry : Military Specialists : Armament Personnel : Aircraft : Military Uses : Gas and Aircraft : Military Aircraft : Aircraft Bombs : Commercial Aircraft : Incidental Disarmament Checks : Design and Technical Convertibility : Sighting, Bomb- Dropping, and Other Appliances : Personnel and Inspection
This is only a special problem in the sense that we have not dealt with it systematically in the previous chapters, nor can we do so here in any detail. But it is actually one of the broad fields and one of the basic problems of the whole subject of disarmament. It is important that we should examine the main principles relating to the limitation of combatants in a disarmament scheme, and note how the latter interlocks with the other aspects of armament control which we have examined.
We are on safe ground in starting from the fundamental requirement that the international allocation of the different elements of armament potential, no matter what they may be, must reasonably conform to the standard of limiting the rapid and adequate use of the striking force to special, agreed, and usually defensive objectives. It must be made very difficult indeed, if not impossible, for uncontrolled resources left out of the disarmament scheme to contribute to surprise and outlawed aggression in such a short time as to prejudice the successful operation of the processes of judicial settlement and arbitration. The magnitude and distribution of combatants must conform to such standards just as much as those other aspects of armament which we have considered.
It is curious that the world should hear so much about "the private manufacture of arms" and yet be so silent on the question of the manufacture of combatants. The danger is equally real,