CHAPTER 6.--END OF BOOK V. THE SEVERAL MORAL VIRTUES AND VICES.
6. We have already said that courage is modera tion or observance of the mean with respect to feelings of fear and confidence.
Of courage and the opposite vices.
Now, fear evidently is excited by fearful things, and these are, roughly speaking, evil things; and so fear is sometimes defined as "expectation of evil."
Fear, then, is excited by evil of any kind, e.g. by disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death; but it does not appear that every kind gives scope for courage. There are things which we actually ought to fear, which it is noble to fear and base not to fear, e.g. disgrace. He who fears disgrace is an honourable man, with a due sense of shame, while he who fears it not is shameless (though some people stretch the word courageous so far as to apply it to him; for he has a certain resemblance to the courageous man, courage also being a kind of fearlessness). Poverty, per haps, we ought not to fear, nor disease, nor generally those things that are not the result of vice, and do not depend upon ourselves. But still to be fearless in regard to these things is not strictly courage; though here also the term is sometimes applied in virtue of a certain resemblance. There are people,
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Publication information: Book title: The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Edition: 15th. Contributors: F. H. Peters - Translator, Aristotle - Author. Publisher: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Place of publication: London. Publication year: 1881. Page number: 80.
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