Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964

As suggested earlier, Soviet policies toward the West from 1957 to 1962 could be depicted in terms of four simplified models. Each of the four hypotheses could be partially, but probably not convincingly, supported by empirical evidence. First, there was no inexorable movement toward live-and-let- live, as demonstrated by the Cuban adventure if not by pressure on Berlin and elsewhere. Second, there was no unbroken "post-Sputnik offensive," because Moscow made serious moves toward improvement of East-West relations at many moments during these years but especially in 1958-1960. Third, there was no clear alternation of hard and soft modalities, because the two often operated simultaneously, most obviously, for example, when pressure began in late 1958 for a German Peace Treaty or again in 1962, when great ambivalence characterized Soviet policy. Fourth, it would be most plausible to argue that a hard and soft line generally functioned simultaneously, but this would beg important questions concerning the over-all thrust of Soviet policy. This

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