Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965

By Herbert G. Schoonmaker | Go to book overview

operating in fifteen- to twenty-man commando units, each responsible for a certain portion of the city. Although the commando units were ostensibly under Caamaño's control, the degree of control was doubtful. These commando units often operated behind the facade of an organization such as a student body or political party, but the intelligence services were able to identify the commanders of most units. 28

In addition to the intelligence collection program, U.S. specialists developed a program for counterintelligence. Military counter- intelligence operations were closely coordinated with the CIA and later with the FBI. Counterintelligence personnel compiled personality files and lists that categorized rebel activists according to their political affiliation, ideological commitments, and degrees of involvement in the revolt. Initially these files and lists had to be built from raw information because the CIA and embassy staffs had burned many of their records early in the revolt when they thought the embassy might be overrun. Of particular value in this effort were the detainee interrogation reports from the Detainee Center. The counterintelligence information was particularly useful for U.S. soldiers manning checkpoints on the corridor. They were able to stop and detain individuals whose names appeared on the counterintelligence list. 29


NOTES
1.
Tompkins, "Ubique," p. 39; Phiblant, Report of Participation, encl. 2, p. 2.
2.
Phiblant, Report of Participation, encl. 2, p. 5; Tompkins, Ubique, p. 39.
3.
Phiblant, Report of Participation, encl. 3, pp. 1-3.
4.
Phiblant, Report of Participation, encl. 4, p. 1.
5.
Phiblant, Report of Participation, encl. 3, p. 3and tab B and encl. 4, p. 2.
6.
Mansbach, Dominican Crisis 1965, p. 31; Dare, Dominican Diary, p. 45.
7.
U.S.F.D.R., "Stability Operations," pt. 1, v. 2, p. 48; Szulc, Dominican Diary, p. 110.
8.
Szulc, Dominican Diary, p. 110; Yates, Power Pack, pp. 133- 135; "All American Teamwork," Army Digest ( January 1967), p. 21.
9.
"All American Teamwork," Army Digest ( January 1967), p. 21.
10.
Moskos, "Grace under Pressure."

-106-

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Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Recent Titles in Contributions in Military Studies ii
  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Maps ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • Preface xv
  • 1 - Introduction 1
  • 2 - Revolt and Response (24-27 April) 19
  • Notes 29
  • 3 - Decisions and Initial Operations (28-29 April) 33
  • Notes 42
  • 4 - Crisis Management 49
  • Notes 74
  • 6 - Military and Diplomatic Coordination (30 April-5 May) 77
  • Notes 92
  • 7 - Support Operations 97
  • Notes 106
  • 8 - Peace Force and Political Settlement (may 1965-Sept. 1966) 109
  • Notes 119
  • 9 - Conclusions 123
  • Bibliography 135
  • Index 145
  • About the Author 153
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