Boris Rumer

The main precondition for survival and social-economic progress
in the newborn states of Central Asia is political stability in this
region. At the end of December 1993 (i.e., two years after these
states first appeared on the political map), the Economist predicted,
with good reason, that this region would be "one of the most
unstable parts of the world over the next decade." ¹ Despite dire
predictions, post-Soviet Central Asia has nonetheless survived
intact, even if buffeted about by stormy conflict. The first years of
freedom from imperial control have been harsh and repressive, but
have avoided massive fratricide. While alarmist fears of balkani-
zation in the region have thus far not been realized, it would be
foolhardy to become unduly optimistic. The fact is that peace in
this region is extremely fragile; the preconditions for its survival
are subject to constant change. If destabilization is successfully
averted in this highly volatile region, that itself will be a singular
achievement and will make a solution to the current economic
crisis possible.

In essence, there are two fundamental prerequisites for peace in
Central Asia: (1) the strength and viability of existing regimes and
(2) a balance of interests among the three main "players"--Russia,
China, and the United States (and especially the first two powers).

The strength of each regime will depend primarily on the
condition of the economy in that country. Of the five Central
Asian countries, Uzbekistan has the greatest chances for economic
stabilization. Its president, Islam Karimov, is not only a "strong-

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