Crises in the Balkans: Views from the Participants

By Constantine P. Danopoulos; Kostas G. Messas | Go to book overview

3
Defeating "Greater Serbia," Building Greater Milosevic

Obrad Kesic

For those that hate one another are not the problem in this world. They always resemble one another. Enemies are always the same, or become so with time, for they could not be enemies otherwise.

-- Milorad Pavic1

The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia caught the international powers by surprise and unprepared to deal with the crisis that followed. America was still celebrating its victory over Iraq, televised to an entire nation eager to erase forever the shadow of defeat in Vietnam over two decades earlier. The European Community (and since 1991, the European Union -- EU) was celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall and making plans for greater integration. At the same time, the Soviet Union was showing increasing signs of disintegration and was in the midst of an identity crisis, which would plague Gorbachev's successor throughout the Yugoslav tragedy. As the situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated and warning bells rang louder, most world leaders took little notice of this faraway place of which they knew little.

In most sports, dance, joke telling, and perhaps even in love, timing is everything. In Yugoslavia's demise timing was critical. As complex array of critical political, social and economic problems -- combined with populist politics, fueled by nationalist aspirations and a lack of preparedness on the part of global powers -- mixed and set off an explosion which rocked the foundations of international institutions and created fissures in the Western alliance. Early on, the European and American governments abdicated any constructive role

-47-

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Crises in the Balkans: Views from the Participants
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Foreword vii
  • Preface and Acknowledgments ix
  • 1: Ethnonationalism, Security, and Conflict in the Balkans 1
  • Notes 17
  • 2: Of Shatter Belts and Powder Kegs: A Brief Survey of Yugoslav History 19
  • Notes 41
  • 3: Defeating "Greater Serbia," Building Greater Milosevic 47
  • Notes 70
  • 4: Franjo Tudjman's Croatia and the Balkans 75
  • Notes 89
  • 5: Bosnian Muslim Views of National Security 93
  • Notes 110
  • 6: Montenegro: Beyond the Myth 113
  • Notes 131
  • 7: The Balkan Crisis and the Republic of Macedonia 135
  • Notes 150
  • 8: Greece's Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans 153
  • Conclusions 165
  • 9: Albanian Nationalism and Prospects for Greater Albania 169
  • Notes 190
  • 10: Bulgaria and the Balkans 195
  • Notes 208
  • 11: Turkey and the Balkans: Searching for Stability1 211
  • Conclusion 220
  • Notes 221
  • 12: Romania and the Balkan Imbroglio 225
  • Notes 237
  • 13: Troubles in the Balkans: The View from Hungary 241
  • Notes 255
  • 14: Moscow and the Yugoslav Secession Crisis 257
  • Notes 271
  • 15: US Policy in the Balkans: From Containment to Strategic Reengagement 275
  • Notes 292
  • 16: France, Germany, and the Yugoslavian Wars 297
  • Notes 309
  • 17: Failure in Former Yugoslavia: Hard Lessons for the European Union 311
  • Notes 324
  • 18: NATO and the Bosnian Quagmire: Reluctant Peacemaker 331
  • Notes 347
  • 19: The United Nations and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia 351
  • Conclusion 367
  • Notes 368
  • About the Editors and Contributors 371
  • Index 381
  • About the Book 390
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