union. It sacrificed its Yugoslav policy to maintain the appearance, if not the reality (which did not exist), of Franco-German harmony, and apparently in vain. The EU's hoped for result, in the form of a genuine common foreign and security policy, did not emerge from Maastricht. Instead, the failure of Paris and Bonn to deal candidly with the issues that divided them disillusioned those nations that most needed the success of postwar western Europe, and especially of Franco-German cooperation, in order to face their own difficult futures.
Since then, the only apparent answer to the question of who speaks for Europe, is: no one, certainly neither Paris nor Bonn. More disturbing still, the voice seems not to be missed.
The authors wish to thank Cornelia Danier, librarian at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, D.C., for her invaluable research assistance in preparing this chapter.
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Publication information: Book title: Crises in the Balkans:Views from the Participants. Contributors: Constantine P. Danopoulos - Editor, Kostas G. Messas - Editor. Publisher: Westview Press. Place of publication: Boulder, CO. Publication year: 1997. Page number: 309.
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