he was capable, and then he should feel much more comfortable facing the right way up.


NOTES
1.
Hegel notoriously claimed the beauty of art to be "higher' than that of nature, but whether that puts him in the way of thinking the term ambiguous is unclear. For him, 'higher' is explained in terms of being endowed with consciousness, natural beauty merely evoking pleasurable response, artistic beauty pleasingly embodying thought. But this radical difference between the two leaves it quite open whether Hegel would be bound to say that we have to do with two different species of the same thing or two quite distinct things. Bound or not, I fancy that he would in fact locate ambiguity here, since for him the lowest form of beauty proper is found in architecture, not in nature. Be this as it may, it should become plain that Kant would view the Hegelian conception of natural beauty as a travesty of the truth anyway, particularly if it is supposed to be a faithful, though critical, rendering of Kant's own.
2.
That the third and fourth claims appear in the reverse order in the text makes it difficult to appreciate that the fourth serves to explain the third. As Kant writes (cf. §§11.2 and 12.2), what the fourth explains is the universality of the second, but what it really aims at is the normativity of the judgment. In Kant's analysis, it is unfortunate that the third and fourth appear separately. He would have done better to exchange the 'universal and necessary pleasure' locution for one that he does not use, and speak of 'universally necessary pleasure'.
3.
For one version of the criticism, see Stephen Bungay, Beauty and Truth ( Oxford, 1984), p. 16: 'As a pure judgment of taste involves no intellectual interest (§16), and art is distinguished by "aesthetic ideas" (§§42 ff.), aesthetic judgements appear to have nothing to do with art; indeed, artistic judgment must be intellectual as well as, or even rather than, aesthetic.
4.
Cf. Paul Guyer in "Interest, nature, and art: A problem in Kant's aesthetics", Review of Metaphysics 31 ( 1977/8), 580-603.
5.
I mean that the explicans of 'o is a beautiful work of art' would take something like the form: (E Representation x)(A DisinterestedSpectator y)(y [has good reason to] take pleasure in o sub x), and then be correspondingly hard ever to show either false or true.
6.
It vigorously surfaces again at §15.4.
7.
Textual justification for this can be found at §11.1 and at Introduction VII.2 However, the divisions within purposiveness are complex and I postpone discussion of them until section 111. See in particular note 9 below.
8.
The reason is that the artist's work may be beautiful through bringing us a benefit, the thought of which did not guide him in its construction. Of course, he may have been guided by it, but whether he was or not will be a contingent matter. This has the consequence for Kant's general theory that the third principal claim should really be stated in terms of a purposiveness that is perhaps without purpose, eineZweckmäßigkeit möglicherweise ohne Zweck. I believe that it is simply his exclusive concentration on

-121-

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