U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities

By Anthony H. Cordesman | Go to book overview

5
US Plans for a Major Regional Contingency in Southwest Asia

The US planners developing contingency plans for Southwest Asia learned two important lessons from the "Tanker War" of 1987-1988, and the Gulf War. They learned that the US could fight effectively in coalitions with Southern Gulf forces, and obtain great benefits from the Southern Gulf states in basing, logistics, support and infrastructure. They also learned that the prepositioning and rapid deployment arrangements the US originally made to deal with the Soviet threat were of equal value in dealing with the threat from Iran and Iraq.

US planners could also take into account the military results of the Iran- Iraq War and Gulf War. They could base their calculations on the fact that Iran had lost nearly 50% of its inventory of major land weapons in its climactic defeats by Iraq in 1988, and had not had major new deliveries of high technology weapons since the fall of the Shah. Further, they could take account of Iraq's massive losses during the Gulf War, and the fact Iraq could not obtain major military resupply until UN sanctions were lifted.

At the same time, the US planners working on Gulf contingencies at the time of the Bottom Up Review felt they were dealing with two hostile regimes whose conduct was unpredictable, which might take actions that could escalate to major conflicts, and which would rebuild their military capabilities as soon as they were given the opportunity to do so. They also felt they had to plan to deal with both current and future Iranian and Iraq capabilities, rather than intentions. As a result, US planners concluded that the only way to deter Iran and Iraq was to maintain a US military presence in the Gulf, develop the ability to rapidly deploy massive amounts of US air power and substantial amounts of US armor, and find ways of strengthening Southern Gulf forces as much as possible.

In the case of Iran, the US saw the primary mid-term threats as an Iranian airborne or amphibious intervention in the case of a revolt or upheaval in a Southern Gulf state, Iranian attempts to become the dominant naval and air power in the Gulf and to use this power to influence

-39-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 145

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.