Syllabus on International Relations

By Parker Thomas Moon; Institute of International Education (New York, N.Y.) | Go to book overview
tions for the Great War. G. H. Perris, The War Traders. P. Snowden, Dreadnaughts and Dividends. N. Brailsford, War of Steel and Gold. D. S. Jordan, War and Waste, also "Interlocking Directorates of War" in World's Work, July 1913, p. 278. Streit, Where Iron Is. G. L. Dickinson , The Choice Before Us, chs. 5-8. G. Nasmyth, Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory. # J. Novicow, War and Its Alleged Benefits. Also of interest are: J. Langdon Davies, Militarism in Education. G. E. Partridge , Psychology of Nations, part I. # C. J. H. Hayes, "The War of the Nations", Pol. Sci. Quart., Dec. 1914. A. C. Pigou, Political Economy of War, ch. 3. And general references above.
A. AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM (see Part 2, section VI, and Part 3, section XVI).

B. DESIRE FOR SECURITY.
1. The increasing dread of war.
a. Increase of nationalistic and imperialistic rivalry.
b. Augmented dangers to common people, due to larger scale of military operations, improvement of destructive technique, and loss of local economic self-sufficiency.
2. Popular belief in armaments as guarantees of security.
"Preparedness is the best insurance against war."-- Major-General Wood (quoted by Krehbiel).
"The German army is vitally important not only for the existence of the German Empire, but also for the very life and independence of the German people themselves, since Germany is, as a matter of fact, surrounded by other nations of which each possesses an army practically as strong as that of Germany herself."--Lloyd George, Jan. 1, 1914.
a. The British navy as a guarantee of Britain's security.
b. Repeated declarations by German statesmen that German army and navy were defensive; military expenditure as "peace insurance."
3. 3. Paradoxes of defensive armament.
a. Each nation's armament regarded by that nation as defensive; by other nations, as aggressive, for example:
i. French army law of 1913 passed largely because Germany was considering army increases.
ii. French army law of 1913 used by German militarists as indication of aggressive designs of France, and hence as reason for passing German army law of 1913.
b. Failure of defensive armaments to guarantee security.
i. Occurrence of greatest war in history at time of greatest military preparation in history, 1914.
ii. Best-prepared nations involved in the Great War.
c. Tendency of armaments to breed suspicion and hostility.

C. THE "BALANCE OF POWER" BETWEEN TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE.
I. European Great Powers aligned in two rival coalitions, 1907-14 (see below, Part 5).
II. Increase of strength of either coalition a cause of intense anxiety, and still greater increase of armament, on the part of the other.

-77-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Syllabus on International Relations
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 280

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.