conference on low-intensity conflict at the National Defense University. We tend to agree
with one reviewer that the author of the book, "buries his analysis in general circumstances.
... Narratives of the case studies are interesting, if truncated and selective.... There is little
of redeeming value in this volume"; see review by William J. Olson in Parameters, vol. 19,
no. 2 ( June 1989), pp. 106-8.
As noted in several earlier sections, there are a number of sources debating U.S.
strategy in the Vietnam War. One of the most recent and interesting, although brief, is the
Letters to the Editor exchange among various U.S. Army officers in Parameters, vol. 20,
No. 1 ( March 1990), pp. 103-14.
John Gates, "Vietnam: The Debate Goes On", in
Brown, p. 46. See
also in the same book, Harry G. Summers Jr., "A Strategic Perception of the Vietnam War",
See, for example, Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War", The Reporter, September 14, 1954, pp. 31-35.
See U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating
to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 5th revised ed., March 1969, hereafter referred to as Committee Report on Southeast Asia, pp. 114-18. The treaty was signed by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
See Committee Report on Southeast Asia, 119-20.
For a study of the personalities and events related to U.S. involvement, see Townsend Hoopes
, The Limits of Intervention ( New York: David McKay, 1969).
Hugh Mulligan, No Place to Die: The Agony of Vietnam ( New York: William Morrow, 1967), p. 318.
Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and
Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington ( Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), vol. 1, xxxiii. The evidence in Braestrup contradicts the view presented in Loren Baritz
, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us
Fight the Way We Did ( New York: Ballatine Books, 1985), p. 274.
14. Ibid., p. 184. See also Sam C. Sarkesian, "Soldiers, Scholars, and the Media", Parameters, vol. 17, no. 3 ( September 1987), pp. 77-87; and William M. Hammond, United
States Army in Vietnam: Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968
( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988). Hammond's conclusions do not
focus on the impact of the media's reporting of the Tet Offensive on domestic audiences. It
is one thing to note that contradiction in strategy and what this created with respect to the
reporting of the war. It is another to discount the misinterpretations and inaccurate reporting
of the Tet Offensive to the American people. See also Grinter and Dunn, p. 144. 15.
The battle for Hue is one example of the kind of conflicts that occurred in parts of Vietnam. This was probably one of the most bloodiest and vicious of the war. While the
military battle was reported extensively including heavy casualties, little was told by the
media of the horror inflicted upon the people of Hue by the Communist forces, including
execution of officials, students, policemen, leaders, and intellectuals. For descriptions of the
battle, see Michael Herr, Dispatches ( New York: Avon Books, 1978); and Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis; The History of the United States Marine Corps ( New York: Free Press, 1982), pp. 559-606.
William Colby with
James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's
Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam ( Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), p. 231.
See "Global Defense, US Military Commitments Abroad", Congressional Quarterly
Service, September 1965, pp. 58-64, for a chronology of events leading to escalation.