Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

By Sam C. Sarkesian | Go to book overview
15.
These figures are locations adopted from Barton, p. 27, and Waller, p. 10. According to Waller, the 10th Regiment, an all-Malay regiment, was largely an MCP propaganda creation to add an "all races" flavor to the revolution. Harassment by security forces and lack of real enthusiasm for the Communist cause among the Malays led to numerous surrenders in the first two years of the emergency. As a result the regiment virtually ceased to exist.
16.
Stubbs, p. 223.
18.
For a detailed history, see Jean Lacoutre, Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography ( New York: Vintage Books, 1968). See also Bernard B. Fall, ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-1966 ( New York: Praeger, 1967).
19.
Bernard B. Fall, "Viet-Cong--The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam", in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall, eds., The Viet-Nam Reader: Articles and Documents on American Foreign Policy and the Viet-Nam Crisis, rev. ed. ( New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 252. This article originally appeared in New Society, London, April 22, 1965.
20.
Nguyen Cao Ky, How We Lost the Vietnam War ( New York: Stein and Day, 1984), p. 20. Another source estimates the number left behind at 10,000. See Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam ( Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966), p. 75.
21.
Dale Andrade', Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War ( Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 9.
22.
Henry H. Smith, et al., Area Handbook for South Vietnam ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1967), pp. 250-51.
23.
Pike, pp. 137-38.
24.
Smith, p. 252.
25.
Pike, pp. 217-18.
26.
For a brief but useful assessment, see Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam ( Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 27-30.
27.
Adapted from Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis, 2nd rev. ed. ( New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 364, 367-68. See also U.S. Department of State, Aggression from the North: The Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam, Publication 7839, Washington, D.C., 1965. Hereafter referred to as U.S. White Paper. Regular units from the People's Army of Viet Nam were not introduced until late in the Diem period. Direct control of these units was maintained by the North Vietnamese Defense Ministry, although coordinated actions with main-force and local-force units were undertaken.
28.
See, for example, Andrade', pp. 7-10.
29.
This is based on analytical studies conducted by the author while a member of the intelligence staff, MACV, Saigon, 1967.
30.
U.S. White Paper.
31.
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation ( New York: Delta Books, 1967), p. 529.
32.
Thayer, p. 31.
33.
Renata Adler, Reckless Disregard: Westmoreland v. CBS et al.; Sharon v. Time ( New York: Vintage Books, 1986), p. 5.
34.
Don Kowet, A Matter of Honor: General William C. Westmoreland Versus CBS ( New York: Macmillan, 1984), p. 306.
35.
Pike, pp. 228-29.

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