process originally fought against, sometimes quite violently, by their predecessors. In the end, still, patterns of resistance and compromise were institutionalized, together with features of the transferred model. The systems of
industrial production dominating in each of those two countries by the late 1960s therefore reflected not only a common model but also different patterns
of resistance that had brought about a number of adaptations in each case.
"'Allied Control Council, Directive #24, January 12, 1946.'" Quoted in
( 1960: 59).
According to Edinger ( 1960: 71 ff.), close to 97 per cent of German business
leaders in the early 1950s had held a similar position in Nazi Germany. 'There
simply was no counter-élite source of qualified people to assume technical or
economic tasks . . . . Intensive or extensive socio-economic dislocation or intensive or extensive military occupation (or both) was a price which the Western
powers were unwilling or unable to pay to denazify all the German élites.'
"'Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, October 23, 1950'", OMGUS Rds, Bd42,
#17/249-1/8. In France, the peak business association, the Conseil National du
Patronat Français or CNPF, was created in June 1946. The French situation was in
fact quite similar to the West German one. The business community had lost
legitimacy and influence due to its role and political choices made during the war.
Until the end of the 1940s, its capacity to organize and to have an impact on the
French scene would be singularly limited ( Ehrmann, 1957).
Although German heavy industries (including the steel producing and coal sectors
but also the chemicals industry) were not allowed initially to join the BDI, their
interests were, from the very beginning, well represented in that organization. See "'BDI, October 23, 1950'", OMGUS Rds, Bd42, #17/249-1/8.
See "'BDI, October 23, 1950'", p. 15, for a list of those members of the BDI who had
held prominent positions in Nazi Germany. OMGUS Rds, Bd42, #17/249-1/8.
"'BDI, Confidential Information on Members, August 3, 1950'", OMGUS Rds, Bd42,
The situation was relatively similar in France. Members of the French business
community managed to escape for the most part the purge of the immediate postwar
period which hit much more severely politicians, intellectuals, and journalists
( Paxton, 1973; Fourquet, 1980; Rochebrune and
"'Antitrust and the European Cartel Problem, Reply of a German Manufacturer to a
New York Lawyer.'" Printed in Der Volkswirt # 20 ( May 19, 1950). OMGUS Rds,
Those arguments were all used by the BDI in its defense of organized capitalism. Fritz Berg exchanged numerous letters with Ludwig Erhard on the matter in the
early 1950s ( Braunthal, 1965: 238).
"'Ludwig Erhard, Ten Theses in Defence of the Anticartel Legislation, Open Letter
to Fritz Berg, President of the BDI, July 10, 1952.'" Reprinted in
Erhard ( 1963: ch.
16). See also Erhard ( 1958: 120).
Telegram of protest sent by a large German industrial combine to Ludwig Erhard,
reprinted in Erhard ( 1963: ch. 16). The reaction of Ludwig Erhard to the content of
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Exporting the American Model:The Post-War Transformation of European Business.
Contributors: Marie-Laure A. Djelic - Author.
Publisher: Oxford University.
Place of publication: Oxford, England.
Publication year: 1998.
Page number: 245.
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