THE BASIC OUTLOOK of Linguistic Philosophy can be communicated, as shown, either, by indicating its view of the world, philosophy or language--or by specifying some particular doctrine concerning language and the way words mean things--or, most characteristically, it can be insinuated without any general formulation at all, from the treatment of specific cases.
Such piecemeal investigations, which do not avow the general premisses which inspire and guide them, have the consequence that these general principles, not being avowed and indeed being disclaimed, cannot easily be criticised. This is not simply a trick, though its effects are the same as if it were.
This piecemeal procedure is suggested by "Polymorphism", and by the other aspect of the theory of language. In turn, this procedure is the basis for the view that (traditional) philosophy, with its habit of formulating explicit doctrines, is the pathology of language. Hence sane philosophy is merely the removal of confusions and errors arguing from the failure to see the truth of Polymorphism and hence it brings no positive or general truths. Thus everything dovetails neatly with everything else.
Apart from the ideals of clarification, of removal of confusion, this way of proceeding has a definite set of slogans, images and doctrines to provide it with a rationale; namely, that philosophy is an activity, and the earlier idea that some things are ineffable. These two notions are intimately linked: philosophy is an activity as opposed to being a doctrine. It cannot be a doctrine because it cannot have anything to say. It cannot have anything to say either because there is nothing left for it to say, or because it "cannot be said", is "ineffable". So it must be an activity. But what the activity conveys must again be either ineffable or nothing at all. But though it cannot be said, it can perhaps be "shown" (by an activity which doesn't actually articulate it), or made clear, or somehow conveyed.