as they enjoy behind locked doors. They can walk in the park when they want, sit where they want in the subway, and wear skimpy clothes without fearing that they will be faulted for precipitating rape. This is what it means to be a free person endowed with rights, and the criminal law protects this freedom by not censuring those who expose themselves, perhaps with less than due care, to risks of criminal aggression. The blame properly attaches to the mugger, thief, and rapist, regardless of the victim's role in the interaction leading to the crime.
Criminal law represents a distinct ideology about the way aggression occurs. Criminals impose these aggressive impulses on victims. Tort stands for a different view. Tortfeasor and victim interact in ways that generate harms. It is difficult to say that either of these is definitively right or wrong. They are two different perspectives on the same reality.
The important point to keep in mind about distinguishing human causation from natural events is that these categories are rife with conflicting methods and divergent moral assumptions. Some scholars advocate the "but for" test that sweeps too wide. Other writers insist either on the view that causes must possess energy that operates on the world or that the notion of causation should be limited to the way we speak about causation in ordinary language. On top of these methodological debates we find layered our conflicting moral assumptions about the roles of different fields of law. In criminal law, at least, we remain committed to the view that victims do not cause their own suffering. Their participation is but the background event against which the criminal wreaks his harm. 23