Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research

By Fritz W. Scharpf | Go to book overview

by surreptitious collusion. In short, negotiations under conditions of divided government are normatively unattractive from both a welfare-theoretic and a democratic-theory perspective.


NOTES
1.
It is true that a dictator who has an interest in exploiting "renewable" production possibilities must also have an interest in maintaining the factors of production and the motivation to produce ( Olson 1993). Nevertheless, the revenue-maximizing tax rate of the "predatory ruler" will be higher than the tax rate that maximizes social production ( Levi 1988).
2.
However, when capital is highly mobile, incentive structures assuring the responsiveness of managers to the short-term profit orientation of shareholders may destroy the firm rather than maximize its social product.
3.
It has been shown analytically that no budget-balancing incentive system (distributing only the additional revenues created by the agents' efforts) can create incentives such that Nash equilibrium outcomes are Pareto-optimal ( Holmstrom 1982; G. Miller 1990, 330-331).
4.
This is a crucial assumption: The Westminster model will not achieve democratic accountability if one of the two parties is structurally dominant, so that swing voters could not have a decisive effect on the outcome of elections. Also, though first-past-the-post elections favor the evolution and maintenance of two-party systems, they may also immunize the government against the swing vote if the opposition is nevertheless divided, as has been the case in Britain since the early 1980s.
5.
If the opposition does not oppose a policy, it is assumed that the voters will always ignore it.
6.
Payoffs do not go to the swing voters but to the electorate as a whole.
7.
Under conditions of complete information a perfectly rational opposition would avoid that strategy. But information is rarely complete, and rationality rarely perfect. Historically, at any rate, opposition parties have often been unable to sidestep issues on which the government was doing the right thing in the eyes of the electorate. In Germany, for instance, this was true of the Social Democrats in the mid-1950s when they opposed Konrad Adenauer's pro-Western policy, of the Christian Democrats in the early 1970s, when they opposed Willy Brandt Ostpolitik, and again of the Social Democrats in 1990, when they were seen to oppose Helmut Kohl's unification.
8.
As Paul Pierson ( 1994; 1996b) has shown, even conservative governments with a strong ideological commitment to reducing the welfare "burden" on the economy have ultimately failed to pursue (visible) retrenchment policies, which could have alienated important segments of their electorates.
9.
It is not completely disabled, since elections still determine the relative parliamentary strength of political parties, which continues to make a difference in legislative decisions.
10.
In general, welfare expenditures increase with GDP per capita. Aside from Luxembourg, Switzerland is the richest country in Europe. Nevertheless, in 1992 social expenditures in Switzerland were at 20.8 percent of GDP, below the level of Ireland and Spain (21.6 and 22.5 percent, respectively) and much lower than that of Germany and Britain, each at 27 percent, let alone those of Denmark and the Netherlands, at 31 and 33 percent, respectively (Eurostat 1995, Table 3.31).

-193-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 318

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.