European Parliament. On the other hand, it would seem desirable to slow the relentless progress of economic integration by relaxing some of the legal constraints
of negative integration and by allowing member states to regain some degree of
control over their economic boundaries ( Scharpf 1996).
But these are questions beyond the scope of a book that is meant to be about
the tools of political analysis rather than about the analysis of a specific political
constellation. They have been raised here merely to show how the analytical tools
presented in the preceding chapters can indeed be employed to advantage in order to clarify some of the most vexing problems of multilevel governance in an
ever more interdependent world. Whether I have succeeded in this demonstration remains, of course, for the reader to judge.
The background assumptions of Andreas Ryll's game-theoretic model are a bit complicated: Sickness funds compete for members, and they differ in the risk composition of
their membership. It is further assumed that patients think that doctors will pay more attention to the members of better-paying funds. With this in mind, physicians' associations
will begin the annual round of fee negotiations by dealing with those funds that have the
most favorable risk composition among their members (and hence the highest ability to
pay without having to raise membership charges). In order to avoid a competitive disadvantage, however, other sickness funds will then find themselves compelled to accept these
more favorable settlements as well (which then forces them to raise contributions).
These forms of "collibrating" intervention have been systematically analyzed by Andrew Dunsire ( 1993; 1996).
In this context, the objective weakness of hierarchical coordination is turned into a
tactical strength. The fact that the government has a serious "Hayekian" information
deficit and that, as a consequence, unilateral administrative action might be unnecessarily
burdensome increases the incentive for industry to avoid this eventuality.
In the industrial training example, industry cooperation lapsed after the statute authorizing the training levy was struck down by the Constitutional Court on procedural
grounds and when it became clear that the Social-Liberal government did not have the
votes in the (opposition-dominated) Bundesrat to pass it again.
At the time of this writing, the "cooperation principle" is again employed in a major
role: On March 27, 1996, the German government announced that its plans for an energy
tax or a carbon dioxide tax were being shelved in exchange for a commitment by nineteen
industrial associations to reduce aggregate carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent in comparison to the 1990 level by the year 2005 (FAZ 1996). Other examples where self-regulation in the shadow of the state has been effective in Germany include regulations governing
the security of bank deposits ( Ronge 1979; Deeg 1993) and the control of stock exchanges.
I distinguish between capital markets and other markets because only the former
have become truly global, whereas markets for goods and services, though surely transcending national boundaries, are still segmented by the importance of transportation
costs and by significant differences in consumer tastes and consumption cultures.
It should be recognized that the effect of regulatory competition is not necessarily a
"race to the bottom." As is true in the market, there may be quality competition as well as
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Games Real Actors Play:Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research.
Contributors: Fritz W. Scharpf - Author.
Publisher: Westview Press.
Place of publication: Boulder, CO.
Publication year: 1997.
Page number: 214.
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