each run is a one-shot game, and the number of runs is increased simply to average out
the variance of individual outcomes resulting from our use of random payoff matrices.
That is so because we use a random payoff matrix. While players' moves will improve their own payoffs, the external effects on the outcomes of other players may be positive or negative.
It may be useful to point out the difference between this proposition and the claim
of Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner ( 1988) that technical standardization may be best
achieved by a combination of coordination through committees and coordination
through the market. In our terminology, the "committee" would be a grand coalition, and
the "market" would be the equivalent of Parametric Adjustment. Thus Farrell and Saloner
suggest that members of a potential grand coalition might exit the coalition and play a
noncooperative game against the remaining members -- and they expect that this threat
may facilitate agreement within the grand coalition. This is a constellation that we have
The rule may emerge endogenously in a history of interactions among interdependent and self-interested actors ( Scharpf 1993), but it is exogenous to the specific interaction at hand.
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Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Games Real Actors Play:Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research.
Contributors: Fritz W. Scharpf - Author.
Publisher: Westview Press.
Place of publication: Boulder, CO.
Publication year: 1997.
Page number: 276.
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