The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union

By Aleksandr' G. Savel'Yev; Nikolay N. Detinov et al. | Go to book overview

Acknowledgments

The authors express their sincere gratitude to all those who assisted by providing the invaluable research material and information that made it possible for us to document the episodes detailed in this book. The authors especially want to note the excellent job done by Dmitri Trenin--himself a participant in the START negotiations--in his translation of portions of this book into English before he was called to abroad. Our special thanks also go to our American editor, Dr. Gregory Varhall--an American participant and our "opposite number" at the Nuclear and Space Talks negotiations in Geneva--for his stalwart efforts in ensuring factuality, even in the face of sometimes differing interpretations, and his dogged persistence in getting us to tell "the whole story."

There are those, especially in the West, who would argue that even this book--unique as it is for this time (in the mid-1990s)--does not tell "the whole story." We agree with them, but this volume is unique precisely because it is a beginning. If nothing else, we hope that its major contribution is the recording and memorialization of the efforts of a small and dedicated group of "arms controllers." The book (if it has achieve its objectives) not only outlines the Soviet arms control decision-making process for the first time, it also humanizes it. The arms controllers--Soviet as well as American--have made the world a safer place, and they deserve credit for their accomplishment.

We would be seriously negligent if we were not to express our appreciation to U.S. Ambassador Paul H. Nitze for his reviewing and providing a foreword to this volume.

-xv-

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The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Abbreviations and Acronyms vii
  • Foreword xi
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • 1- The Historical Background 1
  • Notes 13
  • 2- The Politburo Commission For The Supervision of The Negotiations 15
  • Notes 30
  • 3- The Big Five and The Small Five 31
  • Note 42
  • 4 - The Salt II Talks: The Decision-Making Mechanism in Action 43
  • Notes 53
  • 5- "Euromissiles" and The Principle of Equal Security 55
  • Notes 68
  • 6- The Start Negotiations And the Final Period Of Superpower Confrontation 71
  • Notes 80
  • 7- The Return to The Negotiations: the Prelude To Perestroyka 83
  • Notes 94
  • 8- The Krasnoyarsk Affair 95
  • Notes 109
  • 9- Perestroyka and the Further Refinement of The Decision-Making Mechanism 111
  • Note 122
  • 10- Medium-Range Nuclear Weapons Negotiations: Was the "Zero Option" Really So Bad? 123
  • Notes 139
  • 11- The Start Treaty: Who Made Concessions to Whom? 141
  • Note 150
  • 12- The Difficult Path to The Start Treaty 151
  • 13- Defense and Space Issues: A Field for Future Negotiations? 163
  • Notes 182
  • 14- The Big Five: from Its Birth To Its Death 183
  • Note 192
  • 15- Reflections 193
  • Index 195
  • About the Authors and Editor 205
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