The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union

By Aleksandr' G. Savel'Yev; Nikolay N. Detinov et al. | Go to book overview
Save to active project

for the negotiations. Finally, joint wording was worked out, although it still failed to give a clear understanding of how the negotiations would proceed. Thus, the negotiations that finally began started with different approaches by the parties as to their form. All that happened later on--in 1985. For the time being, during the period between 1983 and 1985, a long hiatus interrupted the process of arms control negotiations.


Notes
1.
By these moves, the Soviet Side sought to codify two of the three bans included in the Protocol to the unratified SALT II Treaty. The third--not included in the Soviet proposal--was a ban on mobile missiles. U.S. Ed.
2.
At that time, these ideas had no specific definitions, although they probably would have approximated the position later presented by the American Side in the Defense and Space Talks (DST) in the late-1980s. At this point, however, these were purely abstract ideas which had not received careful consideration by the Soviet Side. U.S. Ed.
3.
The Soviet count was based on taking the 200 or so active B-52s and adding the roughly 400 aircraft the Soviets held were in storage at the "boneyard" at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona (where the U.S. Air Force parks and stores obsolete and obsolescent aircraft pending scrapping, sale, or cannibalization for parts). In the Soviet view, these bombers had not been eliminated in accordance with the mutually agreed procedures in SALT II and, thus, by Soviet logic, they should be included in the count. U.S. Ed.
4.
The sides differed even on the names of the three negotiations. What are consistently referred to as "medium-range" missiles in this book were referred to as "intermediate-range" by the American Side. A much more important basic and philosophical difference revolved around the third negotiation, that on "space weapons," in the Soviet formulation. As we will see, the Soviet Side used this formulation to cast the American Strategic Defense Initiative in an offensive context and to attempt to bring in "space-to-earth weapons" (although weapons of mass destruction in this category were already covered by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities

-80-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
Loading One moment ...
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

While we understand printed pages are helpful to our users, this limitation is necessary to help protect our publishers' copyrighted material and prevent its unlawful distribution. We are sorry for any inconvenience.
Full screen
/ 208

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.

Are you sure you want to delete this highlight?