LOCKE AND KANT
§ 1. Our undertaking in the present chapter is of a very different character from that in which we have been engaged in the last two. In considering the relation between the theories of knowledge of Locke and Leibniz, we were in the main concerned with the detailed criticism of the former writer by the latter. In dealing with the relation of the doctrine of the Essay to that of the Critique of Pure Reason, the problem is of quite a different kind. Kant makes but the scantiest of references to the work of Locke, with which, indeed, he was only superficially acquainted. We must seek, therefore, to bring together for ourselves the essential features of the thought of the two writers concerning the problem of knowledge, and to institute a comparison between them. In doing so, we shall be led to deal more fully than we have yet done with some of the fundamental positions of the Essay, and with the place which it occupies in the development of modern philosophy.
To indicate with brevity the relations between the accounts of knowledge which are given by Locke and Kant is a matter of no little difficulty. For while nothing is easier than to institute a comparison between particular statements or partial doctrines of the two writers, such a procedure is in this case more than usually unprofitable and misleading. The Essay and the Critique are both