China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War

By Robert S. Ross | Go to book overview

the end of the military threat from the former Soviet Union, the principal security threat facing China's leaders is to the survival of Communist party rule in China itself. That has opened an entirely new chapter in Sino-American relations in which considerations of tripolarity have little part to play.


Notes
1.
For differences of views among U.S. scholars, compare Steven I. Levine, "China's Foreign Policy in the Strategic Triangle," in Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy, ed. June Dryer ( New York: Paragon House, 1988), who tends to discount China's significance, with Thomas W. Robinson, "On the Further Evolution of the Strategic Triangle," and Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: A Critical Review," both in The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States and the Soviet Union, ed. Ilpyong Kim ( New York: Paragon House, 1987), which treat China as a fully fledged member of the strategic triangle. As for official views, see the account of the differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger, Vance and Brzezinski, and Haig and Shultz as analyzed in Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "From Nixon to Reagan: China's Changing Role in American Strategy," in Eagle Resurgent?: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, et. al. ( Boston: Little, Brown, 1987). These differences also emerge from the respective memoirs of Vance, Brzezinski, and Haig. For a West European view, see Lawrence Freedman, "The Triangle in Western Europe," in The China Factor, ed. Gerald Segal ( London: Croom Helm, 1982).
2.
For example, Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle ( London: Macmillan, 1982); and Honggian Zhu, "China and the Triangular Relationship," in The Chinese View of the World, ed. Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan ( New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).
3.
"This was a joint Soviet-US plot to monopolize nuclear weapons and an attempt to deprive China of the right to resist the US nuclear threat." The Policies on the General Line of the International Communist Movement ( Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 96.
4.
The late and famous British Field Marshal Montgomery is reported to have told Mao when he visited China in 1960 that there were "only two rules in warfare: one, don't invade Russia; and two, don't invade China."
5.
Barry Naughton, "The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior," China Quarterly, no. 115 ( September 1988), pp. 351-86.
6.
Allen S. Whiting, "The Sino-American Detente: Genesis and Prospects," in China and the World Community, ed. Ian Wilson ( Sydney and London: Angus and Robertson, 1973).
7.
For a more detailed account of this reasoning and the policies based on it, see my China's Role in World Affairs ( London: Croom Helm, 1978), chap. 5, pp. 145-168.
8.
For examples of possible mechanistic principles, see Segal, Great Power Triangle; and Dittmer, "Strategic Triangle."
9.
For an attempt to analyze this, see my Chinese Foreign Policy after Mao ( London: Macmillan, 1983), chap. 3.
10.
Whiting, "Sino-American Detente."
11.
See Garrett and Glaser, "From Nixon to Reagan," and Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years ( London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 867.
12.
See Michael Yahuda, "The People's Republic of China at Forty: Foreign Relations," China Quarterly, no. 119 ( September 1989).
13.
Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 913.

-35-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 206

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.