state of that science; but they are not questions of 'fact', save in a dubiously extended meaning of that word. They are questions of logic, or of linguistic rules and their propriety. Or, they are questions of what the eternal Mind, merely as eternal, does or does not see to be valid independently of all factual circumstances. They are not questions of what happens to exist, or come into existence. They are not things 'made', hence not facts in the etymological, which is also the systematically most clear and useful, sense.
Just as the truth that Anselm's argument 'presupposes faith' is made untrue by being taken too simply, as though the Proof had no secular philosophical importance, so the truth that he was a Platonist is made into an error unless construed with caution. It does not mean that if we are not Platonists we can with impunity ignore the Proof. It does not even mean that the strongest version of the Proof is one with a 'Platonic' setting, if that term is interpreted in the most usual way.
Classical theists are, indeed, all 'Platonists' in a certain sense even if, like Thomas, they are also Aristotelians. They all think that the universal principle of being can be a sort of superconcrete yet eternal reality; an 'actus purus'. immune to change and becoming, and yet not an empty abstraction, inferior in value to concrete manifestations of, or creations by, the principle. They think that 'goodness itself' must be the most good thing, or the absolute measure of beauty must be the supremely beautiful thing. They commit thus a sort of 'homological' fallacy. The eternal and necessary principle