empty abstraction, devoid yet not devoid of concreteness or particularity. I find in this writer no notion of the neoclassical solution of the paradox, that it is the actuality, not the existence, of God which must be particular or empirical, and that the existence is merely the being-somehow-particularized, not the how of particularization. Only the latter need be empirical. It is precisely the extreme abstractness of the divine essence which makes necessary its being somehow actualized or particularized. The essence of the human mind, which Feuerbach would substitute for divinity, is by no means so abstract. As Barth points out, man dies, his actions are pervasively tinged with evil, and he exists not as a single universal individual but as each one of us in our distinct individualities.37 These and many more restrictions upon the pure essence of understanding, love, or will are required to transform these concepts, with which divinity is identified by Feuerbach, into that of humanity. Such restrictions cannot be necessary. Thus Feuerbach, like his 'bourgeois' teachers, Kant and Hegel, failed to deal clearly and logically with the Anselmian challenge at its center.
This author belongs with Cudworth as having come closer to Anselm than any of the other moderns considered so far in Part Two. Yet even he could not prevent the Gaunilo tradition from warping his presentation somewhat. Thus, he begins by stating the thought of Prosl. II as though it were the entire____________________