The mind is embodied, in the full sense of the term, not just embrained.
-- Damasio, 1994, p. 118
Integrating theories of emotion and theories of cognition is a longstanding challenge. Although there is a great deal of evidence that emotion affects cognition in a variety of ways, the most comprehensive theories of cognition available (e.g., J. R. Anderson, 1983, 1993; Newell, 1990) have essentially nothing to say about emotion. And the conceptions of cognition assumed by theories of emotion are generally not very detailed. In this chapter, I argue that the cospecification hypothesis provides a basis for achieving this integration. The central idea is that the bodily information central to emotional experience has characteristic effects on egolocative processing, and that these effects constitute the experience of emotionality. Considering how it is that self and object are cospecified in emotional experience will also help to clarify the general cospecification hypothesis.
There is widespread agreement that emotion involves components of physiological arousal or bodily awareness together with evaluative cognition. This idea is expressed in different ways in the early proposals known as the James-Lange and Cannon-Bard theories ( Strongman, 1978), and is a central tenet of contemporary theories (e.g., Lang, 1995). However, exactly how arousal and cognition combine to yield emotional experience