In fact, nothing indicates that Locke makes either the second or third assumption. Clearly, both assumptions presuppose that the senses convey a sensation to the brain, which then affects the mind so as to produce a perception. Yet nowhere in the text is there any mention of brain-mind interaction. Instead, we are simply told the senses "convey into the mind what produces there those Perceptions." If we take this literally, it suggests sensation is conveyed not merely to the brain but into the mind itself. As a result, Locke does not need to assume any kind of brain-mind interaction. By having sensation conveyed directly into the mind itself, he tacitly manages to avoid the problems of mind-body interaction.
Nevertheless, such a strategy leads to difficulties of another kind. The notion that sensations are conveyed into the mind implies its capacity to contain these. But given their physical quality, how can they be contained in something purely mental like the mind? If we define sensation (as Locke does) in terms of a movement of animal spirits,
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Publication information: Book title: Jonathan Edwards and the Limits of Enlightenment Philosophy. Contributors: Leon Chai - Author. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Place of publication: New York. Publication year: 1998. Page number: 121.
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