Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington

Odd-numbered years are pro-Arab; even-numbered are pro- Israel. The contrast in U.S. policy between 1971 and 1972 confirms that axiom.

The cynical may contend that politicians sacrifice the national interest in pursuit of votes and campaign contributions. That is how pro-Arabs have long rationalized American policy. But 2.7 percent of the American people do not have all that influence. The truth is that democratic Israel's survival has always concerned the majority of thoughtful Americans.

As 1972 began, Nixon declared that the Soviet Union had been sending significant arms shipments to the UAR and that the United States had to consider Israel's requests for planes in order to see that the balance did not shift.

Moreover, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended the constant and long-range supply of arms to maintain "Israel's deterrent capabilities and the balance of power."

The Administration abandoned pressures on Israel to surrender to Sadat's demands.

Assured of a steady supply of U.S. Phantoms, which were superior to the Mirage, the Israelis relinquished their demand that France deliver the 50 Mirage planes which Israel had purchased before the Six-Day War, and which France had refused to deliver because Israel had spurned de Gaulle's advice in 1967 not to move.

Earlier, Sadat had won the promise of new Soviet planes and missiles, menacing Israeli cities and their civilians.

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