After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy

By K. L. Afrasiabi | Go to book overview

elaborated demarcation line between the two leaders with respect to foreign policymaking. Because of the complex apportionment of power in the Constitution, the exact provinces of each man's authority remained unclear; excessive concentration of foreign policymaking power in the Leader was a function of Khamenei's activist interpretation of the constitutional provisions that delegated to him the responsibility to formulate "the general policies of the Islamic Republic" and to act as the chief commander of the armed forces. This introduced a certain impediment to the neo-pragmatist agenda to reconstruct the country's foreign policy; removing this impediment in the future could take a constitutional road that would aim at curbing the power and responsibilities of the Leader in favor of the executive branch; or it could take a more informal path whereby the Leader would voluntarily self- impose a foreign policy quarantine, instead of trying to become the guiding moving force of the republic's antidiplomatic impulse; in the worst circumstance, such changes could occur in a catastrophic style that would mark a definite end to the era of dual leadership.


Notes
1.
P. Calvocoressi, "After Kuwait" in International Relations, vol. x, November 1991, pp. 287-301. Calvocoressi's view that "Iran is the one clear and substantial winner from the war" (p. 299) reflects a unanimous sentiment among experts; also, see S. A. Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamentalist Reaction in Iran," J. Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis ( New York: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), pp.52-70; and, D. Garnham, "Explaining Middle Eastern Alignments During the Gulf War," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations Vol. 13, No. 3 ( Fall, 1991), pp. 63- 84.
2.
See "Mohtashemi Comments on Gulf, Hostages," FBIS-NES, 14 November, 1990, p. 57.
3.
On the evolution of Iran's military strategy during the Iran-Iraq war, see D. Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict ( New York: Routledge, 1991); also, F. Rajaee, ed., The Iran-Iraq War ( Miami: University Press of Florida, 1993). The containment strategy of Iran during 1980-82 should not be mistaken for a purely defensive military strategy. As both these books clearly show, Iran's strategy was both defensive and (counter) offensive and, after the decision to destroy the Iraqi regime by invading Iraq was made in Tehran, the offensive strategy was taken to its maximum limit of a "total war." This latter strategy transgressed the conventional idea of deterrence and resembled what is

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After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Tables and Figures ix
  • Preface xi
  • Introduction 1
  • Notes 5
  • 1 - The Dynamics of Iran's Foreign Policy 9
  • Introduction: International Relations Theory and the Islamic Republic 9
  • Notes 41
  • 2 - Iran and the Kuwait Crisis 57
  • Introduction 57
  • Notes 77
  • 3 - The Making of a New Persian Gulf Policy 85
  • Introduction: A New Persian Gulf Configuration 85
  • Notes 108
  • 4 - The Making of Iran's Central Asia-Caucasus Policy 117
  • Introduction 117
  • Notes 145
  • 5 - Iran and the Passages to the Post-Cold War Era 153
  • Introduction 153
  • Notes 187
  • 6 - Future of Iran's Foreign Policy: Agendas for Adjustment 201
  • Introduction: Iran as an International Power 201
  • Notes 211
  • Selected Bibliography 219
  • About the Book and Author 233
  • Index 235
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